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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Overview
We live in a world where terrorism is a daily threat.  While Americans have lived 
with the threat of terrorism on their soil from mostly right-wing extremists (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2005) for some time, the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) 
from Islamic terrorists has brought the issue to the forefront.  While the threat from right-
wing extremists is still very much alive, Americans are now dealing with the threat of 
homegrown terrorism from Islamic extremists due in large part to the growth and 
availability of online tools and forums aimed at vulnerable audiences (young people in 
particular) within the American border (Seib & Janbek, 2011).  Some parts of the country 
are certainly more desirable targets than others, but the threat is real for everyone. 
Finding ways to combat this threat is a daily challenge that the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) faces.  
Efforts to prevent terrorist attacks have substantially increased.  The fiscal year 
2012 budget request from DHS is 57 billion dollars, an increase of more than 34 billion 
dollars from 2002 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011; U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, n.d.a).  Of the 57 billion dollars, more than 1.5 billion directly 
support counterterrorism efforts including imaging technology for the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), canine teams and additional security personnel at 
airports, and working with state and local authorities with various training and security 
programs.  Interestingly, the budget makes no mention of communication programs or the 
campaign itself.  Recently, however, President Obama signed a national-security directive 
that requires the government to more effectively communicate with communities during 
terrorist incidents (Ambinder, 2011).  
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to understand how publics make meaning of 
terrorism and counterterrorism and the messages from the DHS See Something, Say  
Something counterterrorism campaign, and if that meaning has impacted their intention to 
act on these messages.  Through a qualitative approach, I examined (1) how publics make 
meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism; (2) how publics make meaning of the 
campaign messages.  This qualitative study consisted of individual interviews with 
college students at a Mid-Atlantic State University and Department of Defense (DoD) 
employees.  
Background on DHS 
Prior to 9/11, there had been recommendations on Capital Hill to establish an 
agency for homeland security.  The security activities that DHS is now responsible for 
were once overseen by more than 40 federal agencies, and funds were appropriated by 
more than 2,000 separate Congressional accounts.  When a member of Congress 
presented a bill to create such an agency in March of 2001, his efforts seemed to fall on 
deaf ears (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.b).  Not surprisingly, following the 
9/11 attacks, efforts to create DHS were brought to the forefront.  After the establishment 
of the Office of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security Council, and Homeland 
Security Advisory Council by Executive Orders from President Bush, as well as several 
more months of political dealings, DHS was finally established by the Homeland 
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Security Act of 2002 on November 25, 2002 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
n.d.b).  
The DHS mission and its interest in community policing.
The mission of DHS “is to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient 
against terrorism and other hazards” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.c). 
Fundamental aspects of the agency’s mission include: preventing terrorism, securing the 
borders, enforcing immigration laws, protecting cyberspace, and ensuring a quick 
recovery from disasters (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.c).  A few of the 
agency’s most essential functions include working with authorities from the local to the 
federal levels as well as private entities “to strengthen the borders, providing for 
intelligence analysis and infrastructure protection, improving the use of science and 
technology to counter weapons of mass destruction, and creating a comprehensive 
response and recovery system” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.d., p. 4). 
In the context of counterterrorism efforts, DHS identified police-community 
relationships as a key component of its response to terrorism (Friedmann & Cannon, 
2007).  Similar to neighborhood watch programs, the best way to fight crime or terrorism 
in this case may be to empower the citizens (Homeland Security Institute, 2006).  Often 
referred to as community policing, this is quickly becoming a dominant approach, 
although similar neighborhood watch programs have been around since the 1960s 
(USAonWatch, n.d.).  Contrary to the trend in the 1980s and 1990s where paramilitarism 
policing was taking hold (Weber, 1999), community policing is designed to be a 
collaborative effort between the local police and the community to engage in problem-
solving; it is seen as proactive whereas the traditional means of paramilitarism are seen as 
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reactive (Friedmann & Cannon, 2007; Murray, 2005).  As Briggs (2010) observed: 
“Communities are the long-term solution to terrorism, but they need to grow into this role 
organically and in a way that doesn’t merely serve to open up divisions and tensions 
elsewhere” (p. 981).  
Community policing, however, is not without controversy.  In 2007, for example, 
the UK launched the Prevent campaign which “seeks to stop people becoming terrorists 
or supporting terrorism both in the UK and overseas” (Home Office, n.d., para. 1).  Like 
See Something, Say Something (described in more detail below), the UK emphasized the 
importance of local authorities and the community in carrying out counterterrorism 
efforts.  However, the campaign failed to address right-wing extremism, causing 
confusion amongst local authorities and community groups in carrying out the policies. 
As a result, the campaign was seen as a means for the government to disguise intelligence 
collection efforts, and a listless effort in involving the community (Briggs, 2010). 
Additionally, community policing efforts were viewed by many as oppressive, racist, and 
in which true community involvement was never achieved (Klausen, 2009; Ministry of 
Defence, 2010).  In a recent speech made by Pauline Jones, the Minister of State for 
Security for the UK, Jones stated that the UK will focus counterterrorism efforts on all 
forms of violent extremism (“UK and US Approaches,” 2011).  Interestingly, in a recent 
Washington Post article (Smith, 2011) DHS eliminated many of their personnel that study 
rightwing domestic terrorism.  This decision was sparked by a 2009 DHS report which 
warned of the rise of such forms of domestic terrorism.  This included anti-abortion and 
anti-immigration terrorism, and the elimination from reports of terms such as white 
supremacist and Christian identity.  Conservatives complained that this report was an 
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attack on conservative beliefs.  This despite the findings of a recent DHS report which 
concluded that “a majority of the 86 major foiled and executed terrorist plots in the 
United States from 1999 and 2009 were unrelated to al-Qaeda and allied movements” 
(para. 9).          
Background on the “See Something, Say Something campaign.”
In July 2010, DHS launched the See Something, Say Something campaign.  The 
campaign originated with the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), 
which had introduced the slogan in a similar campaign in 2002.  The slogan was 
developed on September 12, 2001, by a New York City (NYC) ad agency. Soon after, it 
was adopted by the NY MTA who posted signs with the slogan and a hotline for reporting 
suspicious activity on trains and buses throughout the city.  After trade marking the 
slogan, the NY MTA granted permission to 54 organizations at home and abroad the right 
to use the slogan in their own public campaigns (Alpert, 2010; Daly, 2010; Fernandez, 
2010).  
Evidence of the campaign’s impact on the public could be seen in the 1,944 tips 
provided to the NYPD hotline in 2006 (Soffin & Padilla, 2007).  In a more recent event, 
New York City Times Square street vendor Lance Orton alerted police to a smoking 
Nissan Pathfinder parked in Times Square on May 1st, 2010.  This smoking car turned 
out to be a car bomb (Daly, 2010; Fernandez, 2010).  Fortunately it malfunctioned and 
never detonated (Baker & Rashbaum, 2010).  The street vendor’s vigilance potentially 
saved lives, to which he credited the See Something, Say Something campaign (Daly, 
2010; Fernandez, 2010).  DHS began to take notice of the campaign’s positive impact in 
New York City and adopted the campaign slogan as a national awareness campaign in 
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July 2010, with the goal of “making people more aware, but also providing them with the 
tools they need to take action if they see something suspicious” (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010b, para. 36).  
In the nation-wide campaign, DHS stated that its aim is to make the public more 
aware of tactics used by terrorists, keep the public more informed of threats, empower the 
public to report suspicious activities to the proper authorities, and work closely with state 
and local authorities as well as community groups to fight crime and terrorism (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2010b).  As in the UK, however, efforts being made 
by some local authorities under the auspices of DHS and the campaign have been the 
subject of criticism.  For example, the Metro Transit Police in the District of Columbia 
(DC) recently began random bag searches at DC metro stations.  Some complained that 
the searches were a waste of time, while others feared they would lead to racial profiling 
(Tyson, 2011).  On NYC’s subway, similar searches were being conducted when the 
campaign was still a NY MTA campaign.  Civil liberty groups complained that the 
random searches were ineffective, fed off of peoples’ fears, and unconstitutional (Powell 
& Garcia, 2005).  The argument as to whether or not these searches are effective can be 
debated, given that there have been no successful attacks on an American subway system 
since 9/11, but there is no direct evidence to support their effectiveness (Metzger, 2006). 
As for the constitutionality of the searches, courts have upheld the rights of police to 
conduct these searches, thereby declaring them constitutional (Martin, 2007).  
Research Problem
By now every American should understand the very real threat of terrorism in this 
country.  So why then, would there be resistance to these efforts made by the government 
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to protect its citizens?  Is it a general mistrust of the government?  Do people feel too 
inconvenienced?  Is the message not getting through?  All of these are very real 
possibilities.  What makes the See Something, Say Something campaign especially 
difficult is that the key public is American citizens.  This is an extremely heterogeneous 
public consisting of several racial and cultural backgrounds.  According to the Census 
Bureau’s 2010 Census Data, the racial make-up of the 3.7 million people living in the US 
is as follows: 72.4 percent are white, 12.6 percent are Black, almost 5 percent are Asian, 
16.3 percent are Hispanic, and 6.2 percent are some other race.  Knowing and 
understanding the dynamics of these various publics is an important factor to ensuring a 
successful campaign (Smith, 2009).  Understanding how various publics make meaning 
of counterterrorism can lead to more effective message strategies, increase public 
awareness, and help in the fight against domestic terrorism. 
Organization of Thesis
Following the introduction chapter, this thesis includes: a literature review of (1) 
counterterrorism communication, (2) the situational theory of publics, (3) and successful 
campaign planning.  I then provide my research questions, followed by a description of 
my qualitative research methodology, my sample, and the procedures used for my data 
analysis.  Finally, I present and discuss my results, theoretical and practical implications 
of my findings, as well as limitations and proposals for future research.    
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
This section will synthesize literature from various fields, adding to the limited 
research on contemporary counterterrorism campaigns.  To provide a strong foundation 
for my research, I will review literature that has canvassed counterterrorism 
communication.  Next, I will review the relevant literature on the situational theory of 
publics to expand upon the importance of identifying and understanding publics.  Since 
this study seeks to make meaning of messages in the context of a national awareness 
campaign I will then briefly review literature on the components of successful campaign 
planning. 
Counterterrorism communication
DHS defines international terrorism as acts of violence that endanger the lives of 
others, violating the laws of any nation, in order to influence government policy or ability 
to function.  Additionally, international terrorism must take place outside of U.S. territory 
or include multiple nations as staging grounds.  Domestic terrorism includes the same 
acts of violence, but must be committed within U.S. territory (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008, p. 13).   
The See Something, Say Something campaign is a terrorism prevention 
communication campaign.  DHS hopes that by reaching out to the public, they can 
prevent another terrorist attack from happening (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2010b).  Obviously DHS personnel cannot be everywhere at all times.  So, they have 
decided that one of the best measures to help prevent such a crisis from occurring is to 
make the public more vigilant.  A repeated theme of the campaign is that “homeland 
security begins with hometown security” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010a, 
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para. 2; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010c, para. 2).  DHS is relying on 
communities and citizens to work with local law enforcement, similar in nature to 
neighborhood watch programs.  
Neighborhood watch programs have existed in the U.S. since the 1960s.  In 2002, 
the National Sheriffs Association (NSA), the Department of Justice, and other previously 
established programs, launched USAonWatch as a response to the events of 9/11.  The 
program partnered with and revitalized all various neighborhood watch programs 
throughout the country (USAonWatch, n.d.).  Christopher Tutko, the director of the 
Neighborhood Watch Program for NSA, reported that in the state of Virginia, 
neighborhoods watch programs “have crime rates 40 percent lower than those 
neighborhoods without such a program” (Morse, 2009).  In the U.S. there is a growing 
interest in community policing within the Muslim community specifically.  
The Homeland Security Institute (2006) conducted a study that included a 
thorough review of all relevant literature on community policing in general and within 
Muslim communities.  The authors noted that community policing can improve relations 
with Muslim communities in the U.S., reduce the likelihood of radicalization of Muslim 
youth, provide information on possible attacks, as well as form relationships with people 
in the community that can provide insight into the Islamic world.  Most notably, the 
authors find that the Muslim community is generally open to the idea.  Muslims view 
such interaction with law enforcement as an opportunity to have some control over their 
own environment, perform their duties as members of the community, and as a means for 
making their own concerns known.  However, if communities have a fear of or are not 
actively engaged by the police, they will be less likely to work with them (Murray, 2005; 
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Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998).  As Seib and Janbek (2011) argued “the West or other 
outsiders cannot bring an end to terrorism that attaches itself to Islam.  Only Muslims 
themselves can do that” (p. 106).  This begins by building a relationship of trust and 
cooperation with Arab and Islamic-American communities (Lyons, 2002; Friedmann & 
Cannon, 2007).  
Communicating counterterrorism messages is a daunting task.  O’Hair, Heath, and 
Becker (2005) argued that organizations responsible for safeguarding Americans from 
terrorism must understand the public perception of the situation.  Further, they pointed 
out that for the organization to communicate with the public about terrorism, the message 
must be effective, clear, and concise.  Speaking in the context of biodefense (but 
applicable to many counterterrorism messages), Kreps et al. (2005) argued that messages 
should be both accurate and communicated so as to avoid confusion from its recipients. 
Additionally, Aldoory (2001) conducted a study consisting of focus groups and 
interviews to determine antecedents to involvement, in the context of women and health 
communication.  She found that participants did not become as involved with messages if 
messages were contradictory.  A Homeland Security Institute report (2009) argued that 
when messages providing information about preparing for an emergency reach the public, 
they are often without survival information.  One of the major challenges facing this 
requirement is the lack of coordination between the various emergency management 
departments.  The very serious shortfall in this failure is that when multiple messages 
along with multiple sets of instruction are relayed to the public, widespread confusion can 
result.
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Source credibility plays an important role in the overall credibility of the terrorism 
message.  The faces of the organization should be experts and should be “trusted…and 
credentialed information sources,” (Kreps et al., 2005, p.193).  Trust has been identified 
in several studies as one of the most important components when relaying information to 
the public regarding health and bioterrorism events (e.g., Eisenman et al., 2004; 
Meredith, Eisenman, Rhodes, Ryan, & Long, 2007; Pollard, 2003; Shore, 2003).  Shore 
(2003) put it best when he defined trust as “an unwritten agreement between two or more 
parties for each party to perform a set of agreed-upon activities, without fear of change 
from either party” (p. 13).  Trust, therefore, has implications for competence and 
believability (Kreps et al., 2005; Shore, 2003).  
Pollard (2004) examined six national surveys, with more than 15,000 respondents, 
both before and after the 2001 anthrax attacks, to understand how the public obtained 
information and how they perceived information sources during a bioterrorist incident. 
The study concluded that on the national level, the CDC was viewed as the most trusted 
source, most likely given credibility as health officials and scientists.  Interestingly, if an 
event occurred locally, respondents indicated trusting local health officials more.  While 
the trust shifted to the local level, having a health official was still shown to be important.  
Race, culture, and ethnicity (among other demographics) pose several challenges 
with regards to trust when communicating with the public about bioterrorism and other 
crisis events (Kreps et al., 2005).  Meredith et al. (2007) conducted focus groups with 75 
African American adults using a bioterrorism scenario to elicit responses.  Participants 
were stratified into four groups based on age and socioeconomic status.  Honesty from 
public officials, and consistency of the message from multiple sources were the dominant 
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themes.  However, unlike other studies mentioned above, participants in this study did 
not believe that public and government officials were looking out for them, but rather 
would lie or withhold information.  As a result, participants were more likely to turn to 
personal care takers.  
Similarly, Eisenman and colleagues (2004) analyzed data from a survey of adults 
in Los Angeles County, looking at race and ethnicity to determine trust in public health 
departments during bioterrorism events.  African and Asian-Americans who reported 
living in unsafe areas were less likely to trust public health officials.  African-Americans 
in general reported viewing efforts during such terrorist events as being unfair towards 
them.  Also, Asian immigrants who did not speak English feared that compliance with 
messages would result in deportation.  
In a final example, Aldoory and Van Dyke (2006) conducted six focus groups to 
examine how audiences make meaning of media coverage surrounding a bioterrorism 
attack.  One of their key findings in the area of race, ethnicity, and culture was that 
participants would feel closer to the event if the victims looked like them (e.g., same 
race).  These findings have tremendous implications for counterterrorism efforts by 
public and government officials.  Breaking through barriers and preconceived notions 
based on race, ethic, and language differences is as challenging as it is important.
Trust and credibility are two overarching factors that play an important role in 
communicating counterterrorism messages with the public (Eisenman et al., 2004; Kreps 
et al., 2005; Meredith et al., 2007; Pollard, 2003; Shore, 2003).  How and by whom the 
message is relayed has an impact on its effectiveness.  The characteristics of the public 
will also effect communication.  Little research has been done to understand how the 
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public makes meaning of contemporary counterterrorism messages within 
counterterrorism communication campaigns.  As just discussed, some studies have looked 
at how the public views the communication process primarily during simulated 
bioterrorism events and how publics make meaning of news coverage of terrorist events 
(e.g. Aldoory & Van Dyke, 2006; Pollard, 2003), but no found studies have examined the 
effects of a counterterrorism communication campaign on how publics make meaning of 
counterterrorism and subsequent behavioral intentions.  Understanding how publics make 
meaning of such messages can help determine how to best segment them in order to 
make the campaign messages more successful in reaching the public.  The following 
section will examine the situational theory of publics.  This theory offers a thorough 
understanding of publics and how public relations practitioners can effectively segment 
them in order to experience more success in their practices (Grunig, 1997; Toth, 1996).
Situational Theory of Publics
The situational theory of publics was developed by James E. Grunig in 1968 to 
help practitioners understand publics and their opinions.  He then spent the next 30 years 
testing, improving, and expanding the theory along with colleagues and graduate students 
(Aldoory & Sha, 2007; Grunig, 1997).  The theory provides public relations practitioners 
with the tools necessary to segment publics in a more effective manner (Grunig, 1997; 
Toth, 2006), by explaining why and when people communicate (Aldoory & Sha, 2007; 
Grunig, 1997; Kim & Ni, 2010).  By determining how publics behave and subsequently 
communicate that behavior, public relations personnel can learn how to effectively relate 
with these publics (Grunig & Repper, 1992).  
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In the developmental stages of the theory, Grunig (1997) selected a definition of 
publics: Publics form around a shared problem or issue as it relates to an organization 
(Aldoory & Sha, 2007; Grunig, 1997).  Smith (2009) argues that publics share interests 
and characteristics and are typically cognizant of the situation and the relationship 
between them and the organization.  Once publics recognize a shared problem, they 
organize in an attempt to force organizations to change or the government to place 
regulations on the organizations (Grunig, 1997).      
The foundation for the theory is laid by three independent variables that predict 
communication behavior: level of involvement, problem recognition, and constraint 
recognition, (Aldoory & Sha, 2006; Aldoory & Van Dyke, 2006; Grunig, 1997).  Level of 
involvement is how involved people feel with the situation.  How important is the 
problem for an individual?  Do they feel personally and emotionally attached to the 
problem?  This variable argues that if someone feels a connection to an issue or message, 
they are more likely to give it due diligence (Aldoory & Sha, 2006; Aldoory & Van Dyke, 
2006).  Problem recognition is when people recognize a problem and stop and think 
about how best to act (Grunig, 1997).  If a situation does not appear to need improvement 
then people will not think about the situation.  Constraint recognition is when people 
believe that there are challenges that constrain their ability to act.  If people think that  
they can do little to address the problem, then they will not communicate about it  
(Aldoory & Sha, 2007).  
Two dependent variables are impacted by the three independent variables: active 
and passive communication behavior, or information seeking and information processing; 
two types of communication behavior (Aldoory & Sha, 2007; Grunig, 1997). 
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Information seeking is when a person purposefully seeks information about a particular 
issue.  Information processing is when a person intentionally or unintentionally attends to 
a message and continually processes it (Aldoory & Sha, 2007; Grunig, 1997).  Cognitive, 
attitudinal, and behavioral effects were later added to the list of dependent variables 
(Toth, 2006).  The theory helps to explain when they will likely occur and in which 
publics they most often occur (Grunig, 1997).  Aldoory and Sha (2007) summed these 
dependent variables up well when they argued that “this active communication 
[information seeking] leads people to develop more organized cognitions, hold attitudes 
about a situation, and engage in behaviors to do something about the situation” (p. 341). 
Summing up the theory as whole, Kim and Grunig (2011) stated that when a person 
recognizes a problem, perceives that they can do something about it, and feels involved 
with it, they will likely look for information about the problem and later attend to that  
information.  If a person does not feel the problem involves them, then they will not seek 
information about it (Grunig, 1997).        
The theory is similar to the fundamentals of marketing segmentation in that it  
provides criteria for effectively segmenting publics (Grunig, 1997).  It uses the public’s 
perception of a situation and their ensuing behavior in order to segment them effectively 
(L. A. Grunig, J. E. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002).  The theory itself, however, has roots in 
theories of economics and psychology, decision and communication behaviors (constraint 
recognition), as well as uses and gratifications theories; all of which contributed to the 
development of the independent and dependent variables (Grunig, 1997).  While the three 
independent variables discussed earlier have stood the tests of time, a fourth independent 
variable, referent criterion, was originally included but later removed.  Grunig (1997) 
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defined it as a “solution carried from previous situations to a new situation” (p. 11). 
However, in subsequent studies it did not have conclusive effects on communication 
behavior (Aldoory & Sha, 2007), and it was abandoned while the cognitive and 
attitudinal variables discussed earlier were added (Grunig, 1997).                   
Grunig and Hunt (1984) identified what Smith (2009) called “four stages of 
publics” (p. 60).  Following Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) definitions of nonpublics, latent 
publics, aware publics, and active publics, Smith (2009) further identified apathetic 
publics: 
• Nonpublics:  Have no issue with the organization.
• Latent publics:  Have a common issue with the organization, but do not 
realize it.
• Apathetic publics:  Have a common issue with the organization, realizes it, but 
does not care. 
• Aware publics:  Have a common issue with the organization, understand its 
importance, but lacks the organization to become active. 
• Active publics:  Have a common issue with the organization, and are actively 
engaged with the organization with respect to it.
Smith (2009) further argued that public relations activity can influence the movement of a 
public from latent to aware, or aware to active.  However, a nonpublic can become a 
latent, apathetic, or aware public without such influence.  This highlights the importance 
of considering all publics when planning a campaign. 
Situational theory of publics identifies four segmented publics based off of active 
and passive communication behavior (Grunig & Repper, 1992).
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• All-issue publics:  Publics which are active on all issues.
• Apathetic Publics: Publics which are inattentive to all issues.  
• Single-Issue Publics: Publics active on only one issue or minute subset of 
issues that deal with a small segment of the population.
• Hot-Issue Publics: Publics active on a single issue that deals with almost 
everyone in the population and that has been accompanied by heavy media 
coverage.
As mentioned in the previous section, no found studies have looked at the effects 
of a counterterrorism communication campaign on how publics make meaning of 
counterterrorism and subsequent behavioral intentions.  However, the Aldoory and Van 
Dyke (2006) study discussed earlier in this chapter did examine how publics make 
meaning of media coverage surrounding a simulated bioterrorism attack; using the 
situational theory of publics as a theoretical framework.  Some of their participants stated 
that media coverage had a significant impact on problem recognition.  The media would 
have to show the event to be a problem for them to take it seriously.  In addition to this 
coverage, other factors that affected problem recognition included: authority of the source 
releasing the information; previous knowledge on the topic by the participant; how 
heavily the media covered the attack; and how personally involved the participant felt.  
As predicted by the situational theory of publics, a few participants stated that once they 
recognized a problem they would act on it because they felt their level of involvement 
was high while their constraints were low.  
Several factors affected the participants’ level of involvement.  If the bioterrorism 
attack was closer to their own neighborhood or to those of their loved ones, then the 
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participant felt more affected by the event.  Additionally, if the participants could relate  
closely with the victims, then they felt more involved.  Shared risk or shared involvement 
was the final factor discussed that affected level of involvement.  Similar to the findings 
from the Pollard (2004) study discussed earlier in this chapter, participants felt closer to 
the event if local officials were also affected.  They felt as though these officials would be 
more concerned with their local area then federal government officials.  This provided 
them with a sense of comfort and security.                     
With regards to constraint recognition, Aldoory and Van Dyke (2006) found 
physical, cognitive, and affective constraints.  They also found that the lack of access to 
media was an important physical constraint; something that should be considered when 
using various media types to get the messages of a campaign to the public.  Of particular 
interest was the “information overload” finding (p. 356).  Participants could only process 
so much information.  Once they felt they could no longer do so, they either stopped 
seeking it out or delegated that responsibility to others within their social network. 
Additionally, media sensationalism of possible bioterrorism threats only served to raise 
fear and anxiety among the participants.  As a result, participants preferred to remain 
unaware of potential threats.                   
Aldoory, Kim, and Tindall (2010) delved further into the concept of shared 
involvement or experience, building upon the Aldoory and Van Dyke (2006) study.  Their 
experiment was based on a simulated bioterrorism attack on the U.S. food supply.  They 
sought to determine if perceived shared experience with media portrayals and news 
spokespersons would have an impact on various cognitions: concern, personal 
involvement, and the urge to learn more about the situation.  All of these, they argued, are 
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important factors that influence behavior change.  Further, they tested information 
gaining as a dependent variable.  Referring to a study presented by Kim and Grunig 
(2007), they argued that “in today’s mediated global environment, information processing 
and information seeking are often fluid and overlapping, creating for a public information 
gaining” (p. 135).  
They found that perceived shared experience with victims could possibly have an 
impact on problem recognition and information gaining about the problem.  Further, 
perceived shared experience with both the victims and the spokespersons in the news 
could cause people to feel more involved.  Therefore, they argued that perceived shared 
experience has the potential to be an antecedent variable that should be examined for the 
situational theory of publics.  Additionally, they found some support suggesting that 
information gaining may be a more appropriate variable for the mediated global 
environment as it currently stands.                  
This study will also consider internal publics.  I believe that internal publics 
(government employees for this research project), will likely provide a different 
perspective on terrorism and counterterrorism and the efforts of DHS through their 
campaign than external publics.  McCown (2007) examined internal publics using the 
situational theory of publics as a theoretical framework.  The study researched a small 
college regarding potential changes to their benefits as employees and outsourcing of 
certain functions to determine if internal activism would develop from a lack of effective 
internal public relations practice.  Additionally, the author sought to determine the 
communication strategies administered by employees and organizational leadership as 
well as subsequent changes to internal public relations practice.  Preceding and during the 
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time period of this situation, the college public relations department worked closely with 
external publics but did little to work with internal publics.  Ultimately McCown (2007) 
found that employees did organize as an activist public as a result of the poor internal 
public relations.  As predicted by the situational theory of publics, when participants 
became cognizant of a problem with the organization, they became more involved, 
sought information about the problem, and subsequently organized to address their 
problem.  
Situational theory of problem solving.
As an extension, rather than a replacement, of the situational theory of publics, the 
situational theory of problem solving was recently introduced by Kim and Grunig (2011). 
The theory offers a new, more generalized, dependent variable: communicative action in 
problem solving.  This variable expanded upon the information seeking and information 
processing dependent variables.  This new dependent variable incorporates several active 
and passive communication behaviors, and includes four new sub-variables: information 
forefending and permitting (Information Selection) and information forwarding and 
sharing (Information Transmission).  Also included are the two original dependent 
variables, information seeking and attending (formally referred to as processing) grouped 
together under the umbrella of information acquisition (Kim & Ni, 2010).  This new 
variable assumes that people use communication as a purposeful means for solving 
problems.  
Situational motivation in problem solving was added as a mediating variable 
between the original three independent variables and communicative action in problem 
solving.  The situational theory of problem solving assumes “that most human behavior is 
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motivated by problem solving” (Kim & Grunig, 2011, p. 123).  The three independent 
variables increase the need to solve the perceived problem or situation, thereby 
motivating publics to act.      
The theory also reintroduces and redefines referent criterion.  Problem recognition 
was also redefined.  Referent criterion as an independent variable, directly impacts the 
new communicative action variable.  This variable influences publics’ active and passive 
communication behavior through their history of success in managing problems of a 
similar nature (Kim & Grunig, 2011).  This history could come from a previous situation, 
or a person could improvise one in the early stages of a new problematic situation (Kim 
& Ni, 2010).  Problem recognition, as defined in the situational theory of publics, is when 
people recognize a problem and stop to think about how best to act (Grunig, 1997). 
Problem recognition was redefined as “one’s perception that something is missing and 
that there is no immediately applicable solution to it (Kim & Grunig, 2011).  Kim and 
Grunig (2011) argued that involvement recognition (previously level of involvement) and 
constraint recognition could also affect if a person stops to think about how best to act. 
Crisis communication and publics.  
A campaign that seeks to keep the public vigilant in order to prevent a terrorist 
attack is ultimately trying to keep a crisis situation from developing.  A crisis causes 
disorder and confusion, and exposes “the inadequacy of existing assumptions” (Sellnow, 
Seeger, Ulmer, 2005, p. 169).  It is a situation that has gone awry.  However, a crisis is 
much more complex than that.  How stakeholders view and understand the situation and 
how that impacts their decisions is just as significant (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). Thus, an 
organization does not necessarily decide if they are in a crisis, but rather, stakeholders 
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determine whether a crisis is occurring.  Stakeholders have certain expectations of 
organizations in crisis.  They want to know that the organization is doing everything it is 
supposed to be doing before, during, and after crises. In addition, when a situation arises 
that has the potential to cause a crisis, stakeholders want to know the organization is 
prepared to handle the crisis and return to a normal state of affairs a quickly as possible 
with minimal damage (Coombs, 2012). Those expectations are based on societal norms 
and values.  When those expectations are violated by the organization, a crisis can ensue. 
Publics, as you recall, form around a shared problem or issue as it relates to an 
organization (Aldoory & Sha, 2007; Smith, 2009).  A stakeholder is a person or group of 
people who can either have an impact on an organization’s mission and objectives or be 
impacted by an organization (Coombs, 2012; Smith, 2009).  Sandman (2003) argued that 
publics may not care much, whereas stakeholders “have a stake in the issue” and know it 
(para. 5).  This is not to imply that publics are to be ignored in a crisis.  Smith (2009) 
described how easily publics can move between the various stages.  It is critical to 
understand the nuances of stakeholders and publics in this context, and the importance in 
considering them both in a campaign such as this.
The value added by the situational theory of publics is that communication 
behaviors are related to the situation at-hand (Toth, 2006), and when people perceive a 
problem that they can relate to “information consumption becomes systematic” (Kim & 
Grunig, 2011, p. 122).  Planners can determine if publics are active or passive and thus 
decide how to best segment them into specific publics (Kim & Grunig, 2011).  There are 
several types of publics, and segmenting them is essential to better understanding them, 
and in turn have success in relating with them (Rice & Atkin, 2009). The situational 
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theory of publics provides a well-established theoretical framework for understanding, 
analyzing, and segmenting publics.          
Successful Campaign Planning
There are many factors to consider when planning a campaign that can make it a 
resounding success or a complete failure.  Within each of these factors are tasks to 
complete, within those tasks there are subtasks, and within those subtasks there are 
explicit tasks and implied tasks, and so on and so forth.  Providing all of the best 
practices to conducting a successful campaign would likely prove to be a daunting task 
that would extend well outside the scope of this research.  However, there are some very 
basic steps that can be taken to ensure that a campaign is well on its way to success.  
First and foremost, the campaign planner must conduct research.  Smith (2009) 
referred to this as formative or strategic research: “The systematic gathering of 
information about issues and publics that affect organizations” (p.17).  It can be difficult 
to find a starting point for planning, if the planner fails to complete this crucial task. 
Formative research includes an analysis of the situation as well as key publics (Smith, 
2009).  Analyzing the situation includes understanding the circumstances surrounding the 
organization and the behaviors of the publics that the overall campaign strategy will 
attempt to reach (McGuire, 1989; Rice & Atkin, 2009; Smith, 2009).  Also, what kind of 
campaign is it?  Does it seek to create awareness, instruct, educate, or persuade the 
publics (Rice & Atkin, 2009)?  What are the current and past issues facing the 
organization involved?  An issue is “a trend, dilemma, or development that affects an 
organization’s position and performance” (Thomas, Shankster, & Mathieu, 1994, p. 
1253).  How has the organization managed these issues?  An organization performs issues 
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management by anticipating an issue and addressing it accordingly, before it becomes a 
crisis (Smith, 2009).  Coombs (2012) defined a crisis as “the perception of an 
unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders” which can 
harm the organizations ability to function and bring about negative results (p. 2).  All of 
these facets should be considered when analyzing the situation. 
Analyzing and researching key publics can be a much more complex task.  An 
organization cannot choose their publics.  As stated earlier, publics form around a shared 
problem or issue as it relates to an organization (Aldoory & Sha, 2007; Smith, 2009).  . 
Campaign planners can utilize the practice of segmentation for analyzing publics.  This 
involves the identification of sub audiences or publics.  Demographic information 
previously identified may be useful as well as media usage and socioeconomic factors. 
Doing so can assist campaign planners in focusing resources in the appropriate places 
(Rice & Atkin, 2009).  Grunig and Repper (1992) discussed two types of variables used 
to segment audiences: inferred and objective.  Inferred variables can measure individual 
views, beliefs, and values, whereas objective variables measure demographic and social 
data.  When segmenting publics, inferred variables, they argue, are more useful because 
“the people in them exhibit the desired differential response” and thus provide for a better 
prediction of the sought after outcome (p. 131).  When segmenting publics, more 
emphasis should be placed on a deeper understanding of the respective publics, instead of 
simply relying on characteristics that exist on the surface (Walker, 2006).         
Establishing the campaign strategy is the next step.  The strategy is the overall 
plan for the campaign.  Campaigns are most effective when they are grounded in theory. 
Campaigns are more than merely an application of basic communication practices 
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through a single strategy.  Many approaches should be applied which incorporate the use 
of several channels for communicating. The application of theory allows for such an 
approach (Rice & Atkin, 2009).  Where does the organization see itself going, and how 
does it intend to get there?  This step includes the development of goals and objectives, as 
well as messages and message strategy.  A goal is a general statement without any 
measurable outcomes, which includes the issue at-hand, and defines the end state for 
dealing with the issue.  Objectives are measurable statements that help organizations 
reach their goals.  They should be developed from information found during formative 
research, particularly when it comes to publics.  They are clear and concise, achievable, 
and include a timeline (Smith, 2009).        
Planners should then develop a message strategy.  This goes back to 
understanding what kind of campaign is being developed as this will impact the type 
message design.  Is the goal to persuade or create awareness?  Or is to create a dialogue 
between the organization and the publics (Smith, 2009)?  Atkin (2001) identified three 
types of messages: awareness, instruction, and persuasion.  Awareness campaigns are 
designed to create awareness among publics.  Atkin (2001) also identified two message 
strategies for doing so: information seeking and sensitization.  Information seeking 
messages raise the public interest and cause them to seek more information.  Sensitization 
messages make the public aware of ongoing issues identified in the campaign. 
Instruction messages help provide publics with the necessary tools for achieving the 
desired outcome.  Message that are intended to persuade, provide the public with reasons 
why they should accept and incorporate the recommendations made by the campaign.  
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Selecting tactics for executing the campaign is the next step.  Tactics are the bread 
and butter of the process and a means for implementing the overall strategy (Botan, 
2006).  Again, it is important that the publics are taken into consideration throughout the 
process (Smith, 2009).  Formative research should have provided information about the 
publics as to what media they use most frequently, when they use it, for how long, and 
how often; this information should help campaign planners understand which channels 
are going to be most effective in reaching their target publics.  Resources would be 
wasted when implementing tactics if they did not have a good grasp of this information 
(Rice & Atkin, 2009).  As Rice and Atkin (2009) noted, “Campaigns must make their 
messages available through a variety of communication media that are appropriate for the 
target audience” (p. 446).  Regardless of how the message is relayed to the public, 
credibility plays an important role.  Just as in relaying counterterrorism messages to the 
public, sources should be viewed as trustworthy and competent (Atkin, 2001).  
Finally, campaign planners must implement the campaign and conduct summative 
evaluation.  They should first put together a formal written plan.  The plan should include 
all of the components identified above, as well as a detailed timeline, budget, and 
evaluation criteria.  Evaluation measures the outcomes of the campaign, and should be 
based off the objectives (Smith, 2009).  
Campaign planning is a deliberate, time consuming task.  The steps provided here 
are the overarching tasks that should be completed in order to conduct a successful 
campaign.  Several subtasks and implied tasks exist between the lines of each of these 
tasks.  What this section does demonstrate is that a lot of quality work goes into planning 
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a campaign, of which is the identification and analysis of key publics is the foundation 
for success (Smith, 2009).  
Summary
The literature on counterterrorism communication, the situational theory of 
publics, and campaign planning demonstrate the importance of effective communication 
with publics in a terrorism prevention campaign.  Understanding publics and how to most 
effectively communicate with them is important to the campaign’s success.  While 
counterterrorism communication has been researched, little, if any, research has looked at 
the effectiveness of contemporary counterterrorism communication campaigns in the U.S. 
or abroad.  Through this study I hope to gain an understanding of how segmented publics 
make meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism, the counterterrorism messages from 
DHS, if they perceive a problem, and if they intend to act on these messages.        
Research Questions:
Based on the literature on counterterrorism communication, campaign planning, 
and the situational theory of publics, the following research questions are proposed to 
guide the data collection and analysis of this thesis: 
RQ1:  How do publics make meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism in 
general?
RQ2: How do publics make meaning of the See Something, Say Something
campaign messages?
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Chapter 3 – Methods
I conducted twenty-five in-depth interviews to answer the research questions. 
Qualitative research is a way to interpret the data through the eyes of the participants, 
while filtering “the data through a personal lens” (Creswell, 2003, p. 182).  Through this 
exploratory study, I examined how publics make meaning of terrorism and 
counterterrorism and the counterterrorism messages from the See Something, Say  
Something counterterrorism campaign.  I also looked at how the messages of the 
campaign impacted their perceptions of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as 
subsequent potential actions.  Using a grounded theory approach to analyze the data, I 
looked for patterns, concepts, themes, and ideas that emerged from the data (Berg, 2009; 
Potter, 1996; Strauss, 1987).  In this chapter I will describe the data collection method 
that I used in this study.  Additionally I will also discuss the procedures, sampling 
technique, and how the data was ultimately analyzed.  Lastly, I will discuss how I 
addressed the issues of validity and reliability as well as reflexivity in this study.   
In-depth Interviews
Qualitative interviewing seeks to understand the perspectives and opinions of the 
participants (Creswell, 2003).  “Interviews allow the researcher to understand the 
meanings that everyday activities hold for people” (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p. 145). 
It is important to the success of the interview, that the researcher conveys that the 
participant’s perspectives and opinions are important and valued (Marshall & Rossman, 
2011).  By using a list of predetermined questions, the interviews in this study took on the 
form of semi-standardized interviews.  However, the interviews were not so structured 
that the interviewer was afraid to digress from the main questions, or modify some of the 
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wording as necessary (Berg, 2009).  Follow-up questions were used throughout the 
interview in order to obtain more depth and richness in the answers provided by 
participants (Marshall & Rossman, 2011).
H. J. Rubin and I. S. Rubin (2005) identify three key features that all qualitative 
interviews have in common: (1) they build on a naturalistic, interpretive philosophy; (2) 
they are extensions of ordinary conversations; and (3) interviewees are seen as partners in 
the study (p. 12).  Interviewees should be seen as conversational partners, and as such, 
should be allowed to exercise some control over the interview by taking it in the direction 
they think it needs to go or even by modifying some of the questions or probes.  It is 
important that the interview process allow this to happen if the interviewer is to draw out 
rich depth and detail from the interviewee (Berg, 2009; H. J. Rubin & I. S. Rubin, 2005).
Qualitative interviewing, like any other research methodology, comes with its 
share of cautions and criticism.  An interviewer may be nervous before the interview 
begins.  He or she can overcome this anxiety by learning about their interviewee.  Spend 
some time before the interview begins having a small conversation with the interviewee. 
This will help them both relax (Berg, 2009; H. J. Rubin & I. S. Rubin, 2005).  Further, 
throw-away questions, such as demographic questions or questions about the person’s 
line of work or family life, may be asked at the beginning of the interview to help ease 
into the process.  These questions may or may not be relevant to the study, but are useful 
nonetheless (Berg, 2009).  
Researcher bias can cause the interviewer to distort the information and thus 
tarnish the data.  If asked, the interviewer should express his or her opinion, but in a 
manner that is nonjudgmental.  To overcome this, the interviewer should acknowledge 
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their biases, confront them, and keep them in mind throughout the process in order to 
help prevent them from creating a slant in the research (H. J. Rubin & I. S. Rubin, 2005). 
Sample.
In order to examine how the messages would impact various publics, interviews 
were conducted with both internal and external publics.  For this study, internal public 
participants were Department of Defense (DoD) employees.  I operated under the 
assumption that DoD employees are more in-tune with issues of national security and can 
therefore provide a different perspective on the topic than other publics.  I used both a 
purposive and snowball sampling technique for the recruitment of internal publics. 
Initially, I established contact with a government Public Affairs Officer at a local military  
installation asking first for permission to conduct the study at the installation, and then 
for their participation.  I then utilized a snowball sampling strategy by asking them to 
recommend others who may be interested in participating (Potter, 1996).  This process 
was repeated with other known contacts on the installation until data saturation was 
reached.  
The external public participants came from a Mid-Atlantic university.  For this 
study, an external public is considered any person who does not work for a government 
agency.  A convenience sampling strategy was used for these participants.  Students were 
recruited from communication department classes at the university.  Berg (2009), 
however, cautions against this technique, which is used often in research.  Often research 
is conducted on characteristics or processes to which college students have no basis for 
providing information.  Berg (2009) recommends that if college students are to be used as 
research participants, they should be relevant to the purpose of the research.  In this study, 
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the college students who were recruited as participants attend a university near a major 
metropolitan area with significant amounts of mass transit systems which has been 
targeted by terrorists in the past through large-scale attacks.  Mass transit is heavily 
targeted by DHS as a part of the See Something, Say Something campaign.  A total of 25 
participants, 15 external public and 10 internal public, participated in this study.
Procedure.
The interviews began with some basic demographic questions followed by a few 
questions that sought to understand how participants make meaning of terrorism and 
counterterrorism.  Starting with these questions assisted me in providing some context for 
the remainder of the conversation.  Following these questions, participants read two DHS 
press releases regarding the campaign, followed by a viewing of the See Something, Say  
Something campaign video.  After the video was complete, the remaining questions were 
asked in order to provide information on how they make meaning of the campaign 
messages.  An interview protocol was used (Appendix A).  After each interview I wrote a 
memo as a means of reflection, and to determine if adjustments to the protocol were 
necessary.  Minor adjustments to the protocol were made during the course of the data 
collection process.  One such example were two questions in the protocol asking if 
participants felt compelled to be more vigilant after viewing the messages, and if they felt  
the campaign messages gave them the tools to do so.  A prepared probe question was 
added that asked how those feelings and the newly acquired tools compared to how they 
felt before being made preview to the campaign messages.  This question was only asked 
of participants who were not aware of the campaign.  It was added after some participants 
would discuss this during their interviews without necessarily being asked, which would 
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often touch on constraint recognition by the participants.  I soon realized that this was 
something important that needed to be asked of every participant.   All participants 
agreed to be recorded under the auspices that confidentiality would be maintained by not 
including names in the research report.  The interview protocol was pre-tested with two 
communication graduate students before the first interview with external publics was 
conducted.    
Analysis.  
Detailed transcriptions were created by the researcher, including everything from 
grammatical errors to profanity.  H.J. Rubin and I.S. Rubin (2005) recommend including 
the level of detail that will be analyzed.  This could include laughter, gestures, pauses, 
and um’s.  I recorded long pauses in the transcriptions.  Excessive use of um’s and uh’s 
were not included.  The transcriptions were completed within five to seven days 
following the interview.  
The next step of analysis was coding.  According to Bloomberg and Volpe (2008), 
grounded theory coding involves three steps: open coding, axial coding, and selective 
coding.  I began with open coding; which means that I coded the data as I went through 
each transcript, identifying concepts and themes that emerged from the data (Berg, 2009; 
Strauss, 1987; Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  The major challenge faced with this type of 
coding is that changes in what codes mean may occur from document to document, so 
recoding may be necessary (Berg, 2009; Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  I found throughout the 
coding process that I needed to go back and recode on several occasions.  I then used 
axial coding to fit the data into categories that were identified from open coding. 
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Selective coding was subsequently used to explicate a story “from the interconnection of 
the categories” (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2008, p. 98).    
The unit of analysis used throughout this process was each question (Berg, 2009). 
I slightly modified the recommendation of Bloomberg and Volpe (2008) to organize my 
data.  Themes were identified, collapsed, and even recoded in some cases.  The final 
themes were transferred onto a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet into their respective 
categories.  From there, I was easily able to look across the data and identify similar 
themes and color coded those themes accordingly.  I also tracked the frequency in which 
a theme was used.  Frequency of the appearance of a theme was maintained not for 
quantifiable purposes, but to give a snapshot of its prevalence (Miles & Huberman, 
1994).  After coding was complete, and the themes present in the data were determined, I 
used the data to determine how internal and external publics make meaning terrorism and 
counterterrorism, the campaign messages, if those messages are effective in getting the 
public to act, and how publics would react to a terrorist event that could directly impact 
them.
Validity and Reliability
Qualitative research differs greatly from quantitative research.  As qualitative 
researchers we believe in the value of subjectivity and interpretation in our research. 
However, we do agree that standards for research must be set.  As Auerbach and 
Silverstein (2003) stated, qualitative research cannot be the research methodology of 
“anything goes” (p. 77).  Validity and reliability, used in quantitative research, have been 
adopted by many qualitative researchers as a means for defending their research results 
(Cassell & Symon, 1994).  Validity is whether or not the research examines the 
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phenomena it set out to examine (Kvale, 1995).  Potter (1996) argues that validity is 
made up of two parts: internal and external.  Internal validity deals with the accuracy of 
the measurements of the data.  External validity addresses the issue of generalizability 
(Potter, 1996).  Due to the small sample size, it is difficult to generate a sample that 
represents the population (Potter, 1996).  M.L. Smith (1987) disregarded the idea 
completely, on the grounds that it is impossible to be objective, and the data “cannot be 
verified by appeal to external criteria” (p. 176).  The researcher wants to understand the 
phenomena within the context being studied.  
Kvale (1995) argues that validity hinges upon the “quality of craftsmanship” (p. 
27).  Researchers, he suggests, must constantly check, question, and theoretically 
interpret their findings.  It is important that the researcher avoid “biases that may 
invalidate qualitative observations and interpretations” (Kvale, 1995, p. 27).  Thus, it is 
important for the researcher to acknowledge biases they bring to the research (Bloomberg 
& Volpe, 2008; Creswell, 2003; Potter, 1996).  Kvale (1995) offers a series of tactics for 
increasing validity: 
checking for representativeness and for research effects, triangulating, weighing 
the evidence, checking the meaning of outliers, using extreme cases, following up 
surprises, looking for negative evidence, making if-then tests, ruling out spurious 
relations, replicating a finding, checking out rival explanations, and getting 
feedback from informants (p. 27).  
Additionally, Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that linking the data to prior theory is a 
means of achieving internal validity.  Doing so also allows for a theoretical interpretation 
of the data as recommended by Kvale (1995).  Potter (1996) recommends a review of 
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literature that illustrates how other scholars have “defined certain characteristics” that the 
researcher may use in their study (p. 230).  This helps lend credence to the study. 
I implemented a series of steps to increase the validity of this research study. 
Before I even began collecting data, I took the time to be reflexive in order to 
acknowledge any personal biases that could have impacted the study.  Reflexivity, 
explained in greater detail in the next section, was also maintained throughout the study 
through the use of memos.  The use of semi-structured interviews allowed me to remain 
flexible during the interview process and follow-up on any surprises as recommended by 
Kvale (1995).  Additionally, if I did not feel as though I had a thorough understanding of 
the participant’s perspectives, I would ask for clarification in order to ensure accuracy. 
This study also uses a theoretical framework as its guide for data collection and analysis. 
As the data was analyzed, I returned to the literature review time and time again, in order 
to determine how the data can contribute to the theories that guided this study.    
Reliability is concerned with being able to apply the same procedures in a future 
study and arrive at the same conclusions (Yin, 2009).  This can be achieved, Yin argued, 
by ensuring that the study is well documented, and operationalizes as many steps in the 
research process as possible.  Bloomberg and Volpe (2008) refer to this as an “audit trail” 
(p. 78).  The researcher should provide enough information as to their procedures for 
collecting and analyzing data, and making their data available for other researchers to 
examine.  Following these standards, interview protocols were used and maintained, 
including variations to the protocols that were made throughout the research process.  All 
other documents throughout the data collection and analysis process have been 
maintained by the researcher as well.  It is available for other scholars to review, short of 
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any information that identifies the individual being interviewed.  This includes interview 
notes, memos, transcriptions, and recordings.  
It is important to note that not all qualitative researchers agree that these 
quantitative standards should be applied to qualitative research.  For example, Denzin 
(2009) argued that more flexible guidelines should be used that are not based on 
quantitative criteria.  Further, Denzin addressed accusations that somehow qualitative 
research cannot be considered credible because the perspective of the researcher can 
impact the results.  He argued that quantitative researchers can have the same impact 
through an analysis of their evidence, as they decide what is and what is not evidence. 
Kvale (1995) offered a warning about taking the issue of validity too far in qualitative 
research.  While he acknowledges that as scholars, we must take a critical attitude of the 
research claims of ourselves and of others, it must not be allowed to permeate our 
research.  Doing so could lead to what Kvale (1995) referred to as validity corrosion. 
“By continually seeking valid proof, the quest for certainty and legitimate foundations 
may erode the very foundation that one is attempting to fortify” (Kvale, 1995, p. 37). 
Further, Corbin and Strauss (2008) argued that qualitative data can tell many stories. 
Although I may interpret the data in one way, another researcher may see something 
different.  Another researcher may also draw conclusions that differ from my own.  While 
the raw data is the same, “what is different is the prism through which the analyst viewed 
the data” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 50).  Thus, the argument can be made that applying 
the quantitative standard of reliability to qualitative research will not yield the same 
results from researcher to researcher and should therefore not be applied. 
Reflexivity 
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A researcher who practices reflexivity is one that acknowledges his or her place in 
the social world that he or she is examining (Berg, 2009).  Reflexivity requires that a 
researcher “have an ongoing conversation with [themselves]” (Berg, 2009, p. 198).  One 
way I achieved this was by doing a memo after each interview.  I used the memo as a 
means of reflecting on each interview.  I discussed my feelings about the interview, any 
surprises that may have arisen during the interview, re-acknowledged any biases I have to 
ensure they were not interfering with my analysis, and review the protocol to determine if 
adjustments needed to be made.  Memos “reflect a more personal account of the course of 
the inquiry” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998, p. 123).   
In the spirit of reflexivity, I also acknowledged up front, how my current 
occupation could have had the potential to impact my analysis of this research study.  I 
am a thirty year old, white male who is currently on active duty in the U.S. Army.  My 
father was in the Army for 26 years, so I have been around the Army lifestyle all of my 
life and I love every aspect of it.  I consider myself to be an extremely patriotic person. 
As such, I view national security as an important issue in this country, and feel it should 
continue to be a top priority for the government; hence my interest in this campaign. 
Before I began the study, and at some points during the data collection, I acknowledged 
that not all of my participants felt this way.  Some things were said that were 
contradictory to my views on the issue.  As a qualitative researcher, I understand the 
value in subjectivity and personal interpretation.  Thus, it was important that I 
remembered that my participants have their own unique views and this only served to 
improve the overall quality of this research study.    
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Chapter 4 – Results
The data show that the publics I interviewed for this study make meaning of 
terrorism and counterterrorism in a variety of ways.  The data also show that how publics 
view these concepts vary by external and internal publics (undergraduate students and 
DoD employees in this case).  Variables such as personal experiences, professional 
experiences, career field, and even age in some cases, impacted how publics make 
meaning of not only terrorism and counterterrorism in general, but also the messages of 
the campaign.  There were a total of eighteen common themes between the two types of 
publics on how they view terrorism and counterterrorism, and how they made meaning of 
these messages.  However, there were certainly differences in how these messages 
impacted participants’ feelings about terrorism and counterterrorism, their role in the 
effort, and their ability to be effective.  The development of certain types of publics as 
defined by the situational theory of publics was also present as participants were asked 
questions about terrorism near their hometown, but in some instances, tended to vary 
between external and internal publics.  Below each theme is discussed as related to the 
study’s research questions.     
RQ1: How do publics make meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism in 
general?
Research question one sought to determine how publics make meaning of 
terrorism and counterterrorism.  Participants were first asked what they thought about 
when they hear the words terrorism and counterterrorism.  Dominant themes emerged, 
while outlying themes provided additional perspectives.  The majority of participants 
gave a multitude of responses which fit into several themes.  The majority of participants 
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chose to provide their views of what a terrorist looks like, although this was generally not 
a solicited response.  Other responses showed the effects of media portrayal of terrorism, 
current events, geographical location, participant age, and whether they were an internal 
or external public.  
Terrorism as an attack.  The majority of participants described some sort of attack 
when talking about terrorism.  What differed between the two publics was how they 
described the attacks.  There were 15 external public participants in this research; eleven 
of them described an attack when asked about terrorism.  Of those eleven, nine of them 
described it with one or two words.  “Bombings” or “Suicide bombing.”  Another 
common response was to use the dates of a major terrorist attack: “9/11” or one 
participant mentioned the “7/7 London bombings.”  One participant described it as a 
physical or emotional attack, while another described it as an attack on American soil.  
Of the ten internal public participants, seven of them also described some sort of 
attack.  Some described the attacks in a general sense, with no specifics; saying things 
like “bad guys hurting us” or “attacks on homeland.”  Only two participants used similar 
phrases to that of external publics to describe terrorism such as “9/11” or “explosions,” 
while two other participants gave more of a text book definition of terrorism.  Not 
surprisingly one of those participants has a position in the security realm with the federal 
government.  He observed: “Any kind of politically or ideologically motivated attack or 
ideologically motivated attack on, uh, either governmental or nongovernmental entities  
meant to provide more of a statement above and beyond the actual impact of the, 
whatever kind of attack it is.”  The other participant, who works in the operational field 
with the government, described it as “overt and covert actions against uh, it would be 
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another country or another entity.  It would be to one strike terror, and to try to get a point 
across using a harsh, terrorist violence, rather than calmer, rational speaking.”  
Anyone could be a terrorist/Terrorist profiles.  While these themes are two 
separate themes, it is important that the prevalence of them be described under the same 
heading so as to better put them into perspective.  Only five of all the participants 
specifically said that anyone could be a terrorist.  Only one participant from the external 
publics touched on this theme.  A twenty year old female student felt it was wrong to only 
think of people of Middle Eastern origin as terrorists, saying that any group of people 
could be a terrorist.  “I know that there are people that mainly put Middle Eastern’s for 
um, [inaudible] terrorist attacks and so on.  But I don’t believe that there should be a 
word that only places that certain group.”  
The other four participants who initially touched on this theme came from the
internal public category.  Age seemed to be a factor for two of the participants who both 
work in public affairs for the government and who were over the age of forty.  As one of 
them noted: “Terrorists, I don’t know how old you are, but since I’ve been a kid that word 
has been thrown around, so I don’t think anybody really my age thinks of it in one 
particular, you know, type of person.”  The other participant described an expanded view 
of terrorist groups: 
The terrorism of today, the Middle Eastern, well it’s not even, the Islamic 
terrorists that have grabbed the headlines.  But, growing up as a child in the 70s 
and 80s I remember the IRA and, and every night in the news the bombings in 
England.  And even, even the attacks in Germany, uh, and Italy.  And when 
Colonel Roe was killed in the Philippines.
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While only one participant from the internal public touched on the theme, eleven 
of the fifteen participants felt that terrorists fit a certain profile.  One participant, a twenty 
year old female student, pointed the finger at the reality of the times for her reasoning of 
profiling: 
I grew up, you know, during 9/11 and all that, so it’s been sort of jammed in our 
heads.  I can’t not think Middle Eastern, Osama Bin Laden, when I think of 
terrorism.  It’s pretty much one of the first things I think of.  But that’s only just 
because it’s what we’ve been exposed to so much.
A twenty-two year old female student had a similar reasoning: “It was made so public 
and hyped-up around the time of the September 11th attacks, and that’s why I associate 
that word with you know, is, like, fanaticism, and Islam, and the Middle East.”
Other participants pointed the finger at the media.  One such participant, a twenty 
year old, female student stated: “Media portrays it to usually, when they say ‘terrorist,’ 
they’re always referring to, it’s like they’re always referring to Islamic groups.”  Another 
participant, a twenty year old female student mentioned: “I believe it’s more the media,  
what they put out.  For example on the news, and you know, magazines and stuff that 
makes us feel that oh, the Middle Easterners are terrorists.”
Interestingly, while only three of the internal public participants specifically 
touched on the theme anyone could be a terrorist, only one of the participants specifically 
stated that terrorists fit a certain profile.  This participant, a fifty-four year old female 
Military reservist felt that “Whether it’s fair or not, I think of an Arabic type of 
individual.  Because what’s like in our face is…normally they’re from that ethnic group.” 
When asked what she meant by “in our face,” she stated she was referring to the media.  
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After being exposed to the campaign messages, however, four of the external 
public participants and the one internal public participant who initially felt that terrorists  
fit a certain profile felt differently.  One participant, a thirty-three year old student, who 
almost seemed embarrassed to admit that she thought only of Muslims when thinking of 
terrorism, now admits that stereotyping “Muslim people is not right; maybe thinking also 
about our own people that live in this country that could be also a terrorist people.” 
Another participant seemed to realize that only viewing terrorism as a foreign, Middle 
Eastern threat, was wrong.  “There’s different forms of terrorist and that it can be even 
within people who are American or U.S. citizens.  They don’t have to be foreigners.  It 
can be anyone.  It’s diverse.”  When it came to internal publics, only one of the 
participants felt that terrorists have a certain profile.  After being exposed to the campaign 
messages, this participant had a change in her point of view.  She now felt that “It can be 
from different ethnic groups…It can be anybody.”   
Counterterrorism as a military/war effort.  This was the most dominant of the 
counterterrorism themes with ten participants touching on this theme when asked about 
counterterrorism.  This theme was more dominant among the external public in which 
eight of the fifteen participants used this theme to describe counterterrorism.  One 
twenty-two year old male student described counterterrorism as “Defense against 
terrorists.  So defense organizations such as Navy Seals, the U.S. military defense.” 
Another participant, a nineteen year old male African-American student, studying 
Computer Science described it as “Special Forces, like Black OPS, Navy Seals.  People 
who are specially trained to counter terrorist groups and extremists.”  Most described 
counterterrorism using the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  One such participant, a 
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nineteen year old female student, said: “I say counterterrorism, kind of how we, the U.S., 
went over to Iraq.  I felt like that was in response to the plane occurrences [9/11].”  The 
current wars were also used by two internal public participants.  One such participant, a 
forty-one year old male, who has served multiple tours in Iraq said:  “Well that’s, that’s 
interesting because I’ve done three tours in the last four-and-a-half, five years over in 
Iraq, so I, when I hear counterterrorism I just think to the COIN [counter-insurgency] 
mission and what we’ve been doing overseas.”  
Counterterrorism as government policies/regulations.  Nine participants described 
some sort of government policy or regulation as a form of counterterrorism.  This theme 
was again more dominant among external publics, with nearly seven of them touching on 
it, while only two internal public participants did.  All participants who described this 
theme, however, mentioned airport security as a form of counterterrorism.  One of the 
external public participants, a twenty year old female student described it as: “Maybe like 
homeland security with the airports and regulations that they put on for that.”  A fifty-five 
year old female DoD employee, working in human resourcing, felt it included 
“Heightened security measures, um, in all locations; schools, and airports, and 
computers.”  
Counterterrorism as public awareness and reporting.  This theme was described 
by four internal public participants when discussing counterterrorism, while none of the 
external public participants mentioned it.  This was not surprising given the government’s 
requirements for annual anti-terrorism/force protection training, and the position of some 
of the participants who touched on this theme.  Half of those participants work in a 
security role for the government.  One of them described counterterrorism as:  
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When people are reporting anything that they see that is suspicious would be 
counterterrorism.  I mean the way I look at it would be counterterrorism.  Because 
you’re providing information to the appropriate authorities, they can either 
determine that it is or is not a, a viable threat.  And so you’re countering that, their 
ability to do their action that they want to take.
Another participant was a public affairs specialist who was already well aware of the 
campaign prior to the interview.  This participant saw this campaign as an important piece 
of the counterterrorism effort, and had a lot of faith in its effectiveness: 
It’s changed a lot of thinking.  Not even here for federal employees, but just the 
nation overall.  It’s made people a lot more assertive and aware of their 
environment.  And so I think people are, instead of just putting their headphones 
on and getting on a train and going, they’re actually paying attention to everything 
around them now.  
Counterterrorism as a media effort.  This was an outlying theme among the 
participants with only two participants describing it during their responses.  This theme 
was used from a participant from both publics, but interestingly, they saw the media’s 
role in counterterrorism in a completely different light.  The participant from the external  
public said the media can display “different types of messages.  By, I mean, even just 
things on commercials or any types of advertisements that display those types of 
messages.  Anything can help with even the psyche of a person.  And also just, it 
emphasizes.”  Whereas that participant saw the media as having an active role in getting 
counterterrorism messages out to the public, the participant from the internal public saw 
the media as denying access:
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During the event, if the law enforcement are doing their job correctly, there would 
be a media blackout on the event itself, uh, and its relationship to a terrorist effort.  
One of the things that you use in a counterterrorism mode is to deter them, or 
restrict their ability to the media.
Responsibility for counterterrorism.  After participants were exposed to the 
campaign messages, they discussed who they felt shoulders the responsibility for 
counterterrorism efforts.  This question was asked to see if the collaborative effort 
messages of the campaign were resonating with the participants, and if they saw that as 
an important factor in DHS’ counterterrorism efforts.  Seventeen participants felt it was 
important that DHS make a collaborative effort with other state and/or local authorities.  
Some participants expressed the importance of having citizens play a role in this 
collaborative effort.  Seven participants felt that the sole responsibility for 
counterterrorism efforts lies at the federal level.  Others expressed collaboration between 
federal agencies, but still expressed that it should remain at the federal level.  One 
participant wanted to create an entirely new entity for counterterrorism efforts; a special  
forces type of unit in order to avoid full-scale wars.  
Terrorism as a domestic problem.  Sixteen participants said they did not feel 
threatened by domestic terrorism.  Reasons between the publics differed, however. 
Twelve of those participants came from the external publics.  A majority of the external 
public participants attributed it to not experiencing it directly. For example, as one 
eighteen year old female student observed: “I never really truly experienced it since it  
was just on TV it never really seemed that real to me.”  Similarly, a twenty year old 
female student stated: “I don’t see it all the time around me.  It’s not something that’s  
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hitting me at home all the time.”  One participant placed their faith in the government: “I  
figure the government is doing what it can to prevent it.”  The remaining four participants 
came from the internal public.  One of the public affairs participants felt people were 
more aware of their surroundings after 9/11 and do a good job of watching out for one 
another and reporting information.  This participant was also well aware of the See 
Something, Say Something campaign before this study which may have had an impact on 
her personal assessment of the threat of domestic terrorism.  Another participant, who 
works in the security field with the government, gave a response that one would generally 
expect from a security expert who is likely well aware of threats that exist in their 
immediate vicinity: “I’m not aware that there are agents, or I should say actors out there 
who are willing to uh, conduct those acts and make me a target.”        
A minority of the participants, only four of the twenty-five, said outright that they 
do feel threatened; once again displaying problem recognition.  Half of these participants 
were from the external public, while the other half came from the internal public.  Their  
reasoning, however, differed greatly.  The external publics related their feelings to 
specific situations.  One participant, a twenty year old female student said that “I’m 
always scared when I’m riding the Metro in D.C.  I do feel threatened sometimes.  Cause 
when you’re such a, I guess you could say I feel like D.C. would be a target.  So I get 
scared sometimes.”  The other participant, a nineteen year old female student described 
feeling threatened when in an airport “and I see something fishy occurring that doesn’t 
make sense.”  Internal publics related their feelings to the overall threat posed by 
individuals.  One of the internal public participants, a forty-four year old female who 
works in the operational field stated:  “I mean look at Timothy McVeigh and look at some 
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of that; it is out there.”  The other participant, who was also the only participant from the 
internal publics to have a profile for a terrorist, had some very strong convictions that 
people who migrate to this country do not assimilate to our culture and become true 
Americans, and for that reason there is a threat of domestic terrorism.    
While only four internal public participants said they do not feel threatened, 
another four of them said that while they do not feel threatened directly, they recognize 
that a threat does exist.  One such participant, a female government employee who 
specializes in security said “because I work for the government, there’s always a chance 
that a domestic terrorist is going to target my installation, my organization.  So I could be 
caught up in that.”  Another female participant working operations for the government 
mentioned “there is a certain level of fear you can be an innocent bystander to domestic 
terrorist activity; collateral damage.”  While these participants do not feel a direct threat,  
they recognize that one does exist, displaying what the situational theory of publics refers 
to as problem recognition.  
After being exposed to the campaign messages, a majority of participants 
expressed changes in their feelings about the threat of domestic terrorism.  The majority 
of external public participants who expressed a change felt that domestic terrorism is a 
threat, while it was hardly mentioned by internal publics.  This is not surprising, however, 
given that six internal public participants already recognized the threat of domestic  
terrorism prior to being exposed to the campaign messages.  All participants who 
discussed this theme showed the possible impact that this campaign could have on 
problem recognition.  Whereas they did not recognize it as a threat prior to being exposed 
to the campaign messages, it now seemed to be something they took seriously.  A twenty 
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year old female student who initially did not feel a threat because she had never 
experience it, was surprised by how sophisticated some domestic terrorists may be: 
It made me more concerned about what could actually be taking place...I don’t 
really look into details of somebody leaving a bag on the ground.  They talked 
about having like rehearsals.  I never thought about that in depth, how far they can 
go in planning these procedures.  I never thought about it.  So it makes me more 
worried.  
Another participant, nineteen year old male student, who initially felt more threatened by 
foreign terrorism, had a change of opinion.  
Before I saw the video and read the documents, I saw we basically had domestic 
terrorism under somewhat control.  But now I can see there’s like different, 
varying factors that could possibly lead to a more dangerous situation then we 
anticipated.  
Others said the messages “makes it seem like it’s more common.”  “It makes me feel like 
it’s more possible.”  “It just kind of freaked me out.”  
Before being presented with the campaign messages, only four of the internal 
public participants said they did not feel threatened by domestic terrorism.  After seeing 
the video and reading the press releases, only one of those participants reported changing 
their feelings towards domestic terrorism.  The participant, a fifty-five year old female 
government employee, who works in Human Resources, responded: “Yeah.  Um, just 
reading some of these and watching the video to see different things happening in the, 
right here where we live, yeah.” 
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After being presented with the campaign messages, two of the original twelve 
external public participants who said they did not feel threatened by domestic terrorism 
continued to hold fast on their position.  While some participants seemed to be fearful of 
certain places within a metropolitan area such as Washington, D.C., one participant, a 
twenty-two year old female student had a different point of view.  “I live in the city.  If I 
reported everything that looked suspicious I would be on the phone 24/7.  Because people 
are weird.  You don’t know what they are doing.  People forget bags at the bus stop.” 
Interestingly, five of the internal public participants said they had no change 
whatsoever in their feelings about domestic terrorism because of their position with the 
government.  As one participant working in the security realm noted: “Um, no, but I think 
I’ve had about thirty year’s exposure to this kind of stuff.”  One would expect an 
employee working in the security realm to have such a point of view, but this theme was 
also present among other types of employees as well.  One such employee, who works in 
the operational field, stated: “No, because it’s, it’s what I’m used to seeing.  It’s what; it’s 
very similar training we already receive.  So it’s, it’s at the level I’m used to.”
As participants were presented with the idea of an attack occurring in or near their 
hometown, changes in their feelings about domestic terrorism were evident.  Many of the 
external public participants, however, seemed to have more of an emotional attachment to 
the prospect of such an event; five such participants felt such an event would make it 
more personal.  One participant, a twenty six year old female student said, “Yeah, 
because now it’s about me, and not some other person.  So it’s much more personal if it’s 
closer…because now I feel more ownership for the safety of others.”  Another 
participant, a twenty-two year old male student, expressed concerned for people in his 
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hometown: “Because it happened in my hometown, so, just because it’s right near my 
home.  You have that sort of pride that you want to help people with whatever resources 
they need because it happened right near your home.”   Such responses show that many 
of the internal public participants reached a higher level of emotional involvement as an 
attack occurs in their hometown.  
Four of the external public participants described feeling as though such a 
scenario makes it seem more real.  One participant, a nineteen year old male student, who 
had earlier expressed a deep love for the well-being of his community, described feelings 
of fear:  “This could happen to me.  It’s not just something that happens on T.V. far away 
in a distant land that no one’s heard of.”  Another participant, a twenty year old senior, 
described such a scenario as making terrorism: “…feel more real.  More like its hitting 
me if it’s near my hometown.  It’s more…it’s more impactful then if it’s just in some 
random place.”
The majority of internal public participants seemed to have a continued effect 
from their professional experience; as was expected.  Half of the internal public 
participants seemed not to be swayed by such a scenario; saying that such a scenario does 
not make them feel any different about the threat.  Many of them long recognized that 
there are threats out there, and that such a possibility exists.  One such participant, an 
employee in the operational field for the government said that the idea does scare her 
saying:  “but I’m aware it’s there and it could happen.  I’m already aware so I don’t feel 
differently.”  One of the public affairs specialists again stated that she is already “aware 
that it can happen anywhere.  It’s not just these key cities that we have across the states.” 
Another public affairs specialist, who had talked about his multiple tours to Iraq, felt that 
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such an experience of living day in and day out with terrorism has seemed to turn him off 
to the threat of domestic terrorism; at least near his hometown.  Interestingly, he had 
mentioned the D.C. sniper attacks that had occurred nearby in 2002.  He seemed to have 
some concern about his personal safety at that time.  So while he says he does not feel 
different, earlier comments provided a different insight.  
A minority of the participants, three of the twenty-five, stressed the point that they 
would not allow their lives to be ruled by fear.  One such participant, a thirty three year 
old female student, who did feel a threat, said she felt safe in her neighborhood, and she 
was “not going to live [her] life all the time thinking about terrorism.”  A DoD employee 
working in the operational field had said that he is “a firm believer that when it’s my time 
to go, it’ll be my time to go…So from that aspect I’m not going to live my life in fear.” 
This participant said he did not feel a threat of domestic terrorism.  However, similar to 
another internal public participant, he had expressed the concern he felt during the D.C. 
sniper attacks due to its proximity to him and his family, and its apparent randomness.    
RQ2: How do publics make meaning of the See Something, Say Something campaign 
messages?
Research question two sought to determine how publics make meaning of the 
counterterrorism messages from the See Something, Say Something campaign and to what 
extent that impacted their thoughts and feelings about terrorism and counterterrorism. 
Themes emerged about how the publics view the message in general and about how they 
view their role in the campaign.  Additionally, some direct questions about the threat of 
terrorism were asked to examine the development of publics, its impact on the 
independent variables of the situational theory of publics and problem solving, issues of 
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trust and credibility in relaying messages about a terrorist event, and to briefly examine 
the importance of shared risk or experience as previously researched (Aldoory, Kim, & 
Tindall, 2010; Aldoory & Van Dyke, 2006).  Finally, because this is a public awareness 
campaign, participants were asked what they thought DHS could do to better get their 
message out to the public.  
Counterterrorism as a citizen’s responsibility.  Nineteen participants mentioned 
this theme during their responses; making it the most dominant theme of RQ2 in how 
participants made meaning of the overall messages from DHS.  The theme was relatively 
equal in its prevalence between both publics.  Participants who touched on this theme 
also displayed a moderate level of involvement, and in some cases low constraint 
recognition, as described by the situational theory of publics.  One twenty-six year old 
student participant seemed to recognize that she needs to be involved because the 
authorities cannot do it without the assistance of the public: “It’s not just some guy in a 
uniform who’s definitely looking out for it.  It’s you at the mall, if you work for the 
federal government at the federal government buildings.”  Another participant recognized 
her responsibility as a citizen, and that she has the ability to do something about it: 
First of all, the beginning of the video like explained there are three thousand or 
whatever billion people living here.  You know?  Including me.  I was like okay, I 
live here so, um, I have my responsibility as well to play in whatever is happening 
in this country.  So, don’t be afraid if you see something that is wrong.  No matter 
what it is, if you think that something is wrong, just do your part.  Just call the law 
enforcement.    
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One of the internal publics’ participants working in the security realm felt that the regular 
citizen can be an effective tool in counterterrorism efforts:
It’s good to get the information out to the public.  To know, to let them know that 
their eyes and ears are a big help to targeting or, or determining who might be a 
terrorist cell, or somebody that’s involved in something that shouldn’t be 
happening.
Some participants seemed to recognize that DHS is giving the citizens the power and the 
ability to do something.  One such participant, a twenty-two year old female student felt 
it was especially important that people not feel helpless:
I think that it’s good mainly for the reason that it makes people feel like they can 
do something, that they don’t feel helpless; which is a really big aspect of 
combating terrorism…if you feel like you can do something about a problem, 
then you’re less likely to feel that way.
Raise awareness/increase vigilance.  This was the most dominant theme among 
the participants with sixteen of them discussing the theme.  This is not surprising given 
that it is a goal of the campaign.  One fifty-two year old male participant who works in 
security for DoD summed it up: “Well, I think their intent is truly to increase the 
awareness of the public.”  Another fifty year old participant who also works in security 
saw value in the context of special events: 
So by giving them, um, information on the upcoming Super Bowl and holiday 
season, I think was the other one, um, it’s just like a reminder to say, be on the 
lookout.  If you’re going to be at these venues then, you know, look for things that 
might be suspicious.
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Another participant compared it to the neighborhood watch program: “They’re trying to 
raise awareness…the government can’t be everywhere all the time and can’t watch every 
person…So it’s just kind of using the civilians to, kind of uh, what’s it called?  Um, 
neighborhood watch type thing.”    
Personal awareness.  This was the most dominant theme among participants, with 
eleven of participants indicating that they felt they would be more aware of their 
surroundings.  This indication that they would increase their personal awareness shows 
that they seem to feel a level of involvement with the campaign’s efforts.  One twenty-
two year old male student felt the campaign has “compelled me to just look around and 
just be more conscious about if I see something suspicious and I should report it.” 
Another participant, a thirty-three year old student, realized that being more vigilant is  
important to her own safety as well as that of others:
Yeah, I think I’ll, I will try to be more vigilant.  You go to the mall, or you take 
the metro, you just have to be vigilant about the people.  Who you sitting with? 
Who has what?  It’s going to be a tough job, but hey, we all want to be safe.
The majority of government employees already felt they have a sense of 
awareness because of their duties with the government; six of the ten internal public 
participants discussing this.  Participants did not seem to feel that they should not be 
involved, but more so that they have already achieved a necessary level of awareness. 
Again, this is not surprising given the training requirements imposed by the government. 
One such participant, an employee working public affairs, felt that her professional duties 
keep her well aware of the threat.  “Because I do public affairs here, and I work real close 
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with our AT [anti-terrorism] folks, and our provost marshal office, um, and getting the 
word out there…I’m confident that I can relay some key messages about the campaign.”  
These participants did feel a renewed sense of awareness as opposed to being equipped 
with new information on how and what to look for.  One such participant in the 
operational field said that she felt “anytime you see something like that, you, your 
awareness becomes renewed.”  A participant who works in human resources said that she 
doesn’t “think it gave me, it showed me anything new.  I just think it uh, increased my 
awareness.”  
Counterterrorism as a personal responsibility.  Nine participants expressed a 
sense of personal responsibility for counterterrorism efforts following the messages of the 
campaign.  It was far more present in external publics, with seven of the nine participants 
coming from the external publics, while only two came from internal publics.  External 
publics appeared to have much more of an emotional attachment than internal publics.  
One such participant, a twenty year old student, recalled past situations where she should 
have said something.  “It just made me feel kind of guilty…There are times I could have 
called.  And I don’t know.  I don’t think anything came out of those two incidents, but 
doesn’t mean that it couldn’t have.”  Another participant, a nineteen year old student, 
talked about his concern for his community.  “I do love my community and I do want to, 
as an American, I feel I should have some responsibility seeking out, not seeking out but 
keeping an eye out for threats that could harm anyone.”  One other participant, an 
eighteen year old student, seemed to understand that it was about more than her own 
safety.  “It teaches me to like, look at my surroundings more and not only care about 
myself, but the well-being of others as well.”       
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Internal public participants generally felt that they needed to be more aware of 
their surroundings, but didn’t seem to have the emotional attachment to this sense of 
responsibility that the external public felt.  One participant said, “Yes it, every time I go 
through an antiterrorism briefing or whatever, it always makes me feel like I need to pay 
more attention to things.”  Another participant expressed similar sentiment.  
It’s kind of like, hey, a wake up call…Again, we get too preoccupied, you know, 
uh, uh, what we do in our day-to-day activities, and I think everyone could 
improve on attention to detail with their surroundings.  You know, it helps to have 
a reminder of that.  
Self-Efficacy.  Most participants expressed a sense of empowerment from the See 
Something, Say Something campaign messages, indicating that they could have a positive 
impact on counterterrorism efforts, thereby showing low constraint recognition.  Nineteen 
of all participants expressed direct feelings of self-efficacy.  One example came from the 
twenty year old female student who expressed feelings of guilt for not saying something 
in the past when she could have:  “Cause I have been on the Metro and thought things 
were suspicious, but I’ve just gotten nervous and gotten off Metro instead of doing 
something about it.  But I guess now I’ll take action or call.”  
Other participants felt the campaign’s messages gave him new tools to work with 
in knowing what to look for, and how to do something about it.  One such participant, a 
nineteen year old male student said that:
Before the campaign I felt like there wasn’t much I really could do. Maybe like a 
citizen’s arrest.  That’s the most I thought I could do.  But now they’ve given me 
56
the tool.  Like, they’ve pointed out some things I could report to my poli [did not 
finish sentence].  I can look for suspicious activity.   
Another participant, an eighteen year old female student, expressed similar sentiments: 
“Like I’m more open, like I have more sense of knowledge of what’s going on…what 
tools I should use and how to prepare myself.”
One participant, a fifty-four year old Military Reservist recognized her ability to 
do something through the success stories of others.  Referring to the attempted car 
bombing of New York City’s Times Square, she mentioned: “That guy that saw that car 
down there in New York City; if he hadn’t questioned that, oh yeah, somebody’s car’s 
broke down, you know…that’s how things are going to happen; day-to-day things that are 
um, commonplace.”
Others from the internal public participants recognized that perhaps the best tool 
for self-efficacy is to abstain from activities that could be targeted.  One of those 
participants, a fifty-two year old DoD employee working in security discussed: “But 
really, just understanding that if you don’t go into areas that are high crime, uh, you 
reduce risk.  If you don’t engage in activities of high threat, you’re probably not going to 
encounter terrorism.”  Another DoD employee, a fifty year old male participant working 
operations, when talking about the upcoming 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, 
discussed:
I’m thinking about the 10th anniversary of 9/11 is coming up.  Well, I’m going to 
stay at home.  I mean, yes they’re commemorative events to remember that, and 
to me those are targets.  And that’s not something I want to subject my family to.
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Effectiveness of DHS.  Participants generally indicated that DHS is doing an 
effective job.  The majority of participants, thirteen of twenty-five, felt DHS is effective 
at combating domestic terrorism.  Many of the participants felt DHS is effective because 
of the lack of significant attacks on the United States.  One participant, a twenty-six year 
old female participant, summed up the responses to this question: “I guess lack of news is 
good news.”  Others associated recent success stories to their effectiveness, such as the 
killing of Osama Bin Laden (or the breaking up of a recent plot to attack Soldiers at Fort 
Hood, Texas.  Eight of the participants felt DHS was making an effort but could do more. 
Some based their analysis on the fact that they have never heard of this campaign until 
now, and feel DHS is not getting the message out.  One of those participants felt they 
were doing well in the tactical side of combating terrorism, but needed to step up their 
efforts when it came to informing the public of what it is they do to keep them safe. 
Others felt they were being held back by politics or they were trying to figure out how 
best to be effective without taking away an individual’s constitutional rights.  Three 
participants seemed unsure of DHS’ effectiveness.  They either felt that they do not know 
enough about what DHS does to gauge their effectiveness, or it’s too early to measure 
their effectiveness because DHS cannot release all of their success stories.  Finally, one 
participant felt that DHS is not effective.  Her sole reasoning for this assessment was her 
lack of faith in the job they are doing at securing the border with Mexico.  She feels that 
the border is an open gateway for illegal immigrants, thus making it easy for terrorists to 
cross. 
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Four participants, who either felt DHS was making an effort, or were seemed 
unsure of their effectiveness, also expressed concern over the interpretation of what it and 
what is not suspicious.  They felt that DHS should do more to explain behaviors that 
would qualify as suspicious.  One such participant, a twenty year old female student, said 
that “everyone has different perspectives on what is suspicious and what it not, and I 
think that’s a big issue that this campaign should definitely highlight.”  Another 
participant, a nineteen year old female student, said she feels “like that they have to know 
exactly what to look for.  Because what’s suspicious to me may not be especially 
suspicious to you.”  
Sources used for information about terrorism.  When it came to information about 
current threats, thirteen said they would turn to government sources.  Most reporting that 
they felt the government would have the most information.  Internal public participants 
would primarily seek out co-workers who specialize in the security realm.  Eight 
participants would look for information via news outlets.  Participants did not specifically 
speak of sources they view as credible, but instead most participants wanted to go to 
news sources that they were familiar with, or were the most popular, or focused on a wide 
variety of issues.  Seven participants would turn to the internet.  Most of those 
participants put faith in the Google search engine, saying they would go there to search 
for information.  One participant specified that she would use Google specifically as an 
outlet to seek out more credible sources; although when asked about how she defines a 
credible source, she was not really able to provide a clear answer, only saying she would 
search for multiple news outlets in order to avoid bias.  
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When it came to finding information about an attack near one’s hometown, 
participants expressed a desire to turn to additional sources.  A majority of participants, 
seventeen, said they would turn to news sources to get information.  Many of those 
participants expressed that they would go to national or international media outlets. 
Some felt a particular news source has the best information, or the most up-to-date, or 
they like a particular media personality.  Fewer participants in this scenario, only five,  
would turn to government sources.  All of those participants except for one came from 
internal publics.  This is not surprising given that government employees likely would be 
made privy to more information than a regular civilian.  External publics seemed to have 
the most faith in the news.  Communicative action in problem solving, as defined in the 
situational theory of problem solving (Kim & Grunig, 2011), could be seen when 
participants were put in this scenario.  Four participants expressed a desire to talk to local 
law enforcement, while two others would get in touch with family and/or friends, and yet 
another two would utilize social media sites to get information; which normally involves 
communicating with people you know or are at least familiar with.  Three internal public 
participants would seek out personnel in the security realm for information.  One 
participant would seek out people in the local community.  A total of twelve participants  
expressed a desire to communicate with someone directly in order to get information 
about an attack in or near their hometown.  
Complacency as a challenge for counterterrorism.  This theme was present in 
some of the internal public participant’s responses, four of them discussing it.  This is not 
surprising given that this is a term commonly used in government anti-terrorism/force 
protection training.  Participants seemed to be concerned that people in this country are 
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complacent and fail to pay attention to their surroundings.  For that reason, they thought 
that getting this message out was all the more important.  A public affairs specialist said 
the campaign is “good because we’re a really complacent nation…we have blinders on, 
you know?”  A security specialist felt that “people go through their lives in an oblivious 
state to where they don’t really appreciate the freedoms that they truly have and get to 
exercise; and understand that there are people out there who want to exploit those 
freedoms.”
Factors that affect meaning.  Participants raised some concerns during the course 
of the interviews that could have an impact on how they make meaning of the messages 
and their subsequent actions.  First, participants had a wide variety of suggestions for 
how DHS can more effectively communicate their message to the public. Many felt that 
the video, while informative, is too long for most people to watch all the way through. 
Many of them suggested television advertising as an effective means for getting the 
message out to the public.  One participant, a twenty-two year old female student offered 
this suggestion:  “You know, like a 30-second, like any advertisement that you see in 
between shows or something like that.”  Some also suggested posters and flyers on buses 
and the Metro.  Some participants felt that going to college campuses would be effective. 
A twenty year old female student participant felt that DHS “going onto college campuses 
would really make a difference.  Because I know that adults are more likely to tune into 
the news or read newspaper magazine on what the governments doing.”  A couple of 
participants suggested working with the local community through seminars, or getting 
established with groups that people are already familiar with.  One such participant, a 
fifty-four year old military Reservist put forth that such advice:  
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You know, there are already established groups of people.  Like homeowner’s 
associations…or community activity groups, or FRG’s [military family readiness 
groups]…I mean there are different groups already established that, that people 
trust.  And if you can get those groups to disseminate information from a group or 
entity that they are already familiar with and/or rust, it might make more sense to,  
or be more productive.  
One participant, a forty year old security employee for DoD, had an interesting opinion 
on how to best get the message out.  He thought putting a human face on the message 
would be effective.
I think that if you have actual victims of terrorist incidences providing that 
message, if you have uh, local police chiefs, fire chiefs, people who have a dog in 
the fight basically, uh, if there were to be an incident in the local population, um, I  
think that would be a lot more effective.  I think even if you interviewed some of 
the people that, like interview this gun shop owner that uh gave the tip that led to 
the arrest of this latest wannabe terrorist.  Um, I think getting some perspective 
from him or her, I’m not even sure what the person was, I think that would be 
interesting to the general public…and [would] catch your attention more than 
some policy wonk at the top spewing something that you may or may not 
necessarily tune into.
Second, nine participants expressed a desire to see success stories or thought the 
campaign was effective because of success stories.  One participant, a fifty year old DoD 
employee in the operational realm, thought the public should be made aware of their 
effectiveness.  “If the public is aware, is made aware of the results of their actions and 
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their involvement, uh, to me, I think that it would be better received.”  A twenty-two year 
old female external public participant could not recall any successes that DHS has had 
with this campaign.  
When it comes down to it, have we ever really had an instance where some 
random civilian has reported something suspicious…that’s led to the preemptions 
of a violent terrorist attack?  Cause I don’t remember anything in the news about 
that.  So I don’t even think that we have a precedence on which to say this will be 
effective in any type of physical way.  Some participants, three total, thought the 
messages would be more effective if people saw the ramifications of not 
reporting.
Another participant, a twenty year old male student, on the other hand, was familiar with 
recent success stories and thought it was telling of DHS’ effectiveness.  
Yeah I mean, there’s been, well the Fort Hood shooting and 9/11, but uh, I’d say 
they’ve been effective.  Like if they stopped that Texas Tech one through ordering 
the fertilizer and the Time Square bombing.  So I…and the Time Square Bombing 
was a citizen, right, notifying, so yes, I’d say they’ve probably been effective.
Three participants, all from the internal public, felt that showing ramifications of 
not reporting may also be effective.  A forty-four year old participant working operations 
discussed:  “I think it needs to show what happens if you don’t report; follow that trail a 
little further.”  Another participant, a fifty year old DoD employee working operations, 
suggested using real life scenarios to make people feel guilty for not reporting 
information.  
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They could play a guilt card on the public as well from the standpoint that you 
know, through investigations it was determined that these key indicators, had the 
public been more aware of the things to look for, or getting involved, it’s quite 
possible that these things could have been avoided.  It’s not a guarantee.  But 
these things could’ve been avoided; or at least minimized.
Finally, while the messages of the campaign tell people to contact their local law 
enforcement, it doesn’t seem that that message is resonating with some of the 
participants.  Six participants expressed concern that they did not know who to contact if 
they saw something suspicious.  “The video isn’t actually telling you who to contact or 
where to go.  It’s just telling you that you need to tell somebody.”  Another participant 
expressed a similar concern: “Who would you call?  I mean, it’s a federal campaign. 
Would you call Homeland Security?  Would you call your local police?”  This is 
important because publics could interpret this as a constraint.  
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Chapter 5 – Discussion and Conclusions
Using a qualitative approach, the purpose of this study was to understand how 
publics make meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism and the counterterrorism 
messages from the DHS See Something, Say Something counterterrorism campaign, and 
if that meaning impacted their intention to act on these messages.  In-depth interviews 
were conducted with twenty-five participants.  The participant pool was composed of 
fifteen external public participants (college students) and 10 internal public participants  
(DoD government employees) (See table 1 for a demographics breakdown of 
participants).  Using a grounded theory approach to analyze the data, this study used the 
situational theory of publics as its primary theoretical framework including additional 
variables that have been proposed and studied through various research studies, as well as 
the recently proposed supplemental theory, situational theory of problem solving.             
While I set out to understand how external and internal publics made meaning of 
terrorism and counterterrorism and the campaign messages, what I found was that 
internal publics as operationalized in this study were not internal publics to the campaign 
at all.  I conducted this study under the assumption that DoD employees were more in-
tune with issues of national security.  This appeared to be true among the participants in 
this study, but what was not considered was whether or not they would be internal publics 
to the campaign itself.  The majority of these participants were unaware of the campaign 
and therefore cannot be considered an internal public.  Therefore, the study became a 
comparison of two segmented external publics: government and young adult publics. 
Future research is needed to determine whether true internal publics would consume and 
share the campaign messages differently.
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Results indicate that government and young adult publics have varying views on 
the concepts of terrorism and counterterrorism.  Young adult publics appear to be more 
influenced by stereotypical views of what constitutes a terrorist, which they often 
attributed to the media and society.  This was not surprising given that the mean age of 
young adult public participants was 22.  Many of these participants would have been 
around 12 years old at the time of the 9/11 attacks.  Those events are what these 
participants have likely been largely exposed to from a young age from both the media 
and society in general.  Government public participants, on the other hand, described 
terrorism in a more general sense or gave a definition of terrorism that was more closely 
aligned with the definition from DHS.  This was expected given the professional training 
requirements of DoD employees.
Young adult public participants do not seem to be actively seeking out 
information on domestic terrorism and counterterrorism, as only one of them had ever 
heard of the campaign, and only three had mentioned hearing or seeing messages while 
riding the Metro, or in using the airport; though they seemed to be passive in their 
processing of the messages.  This is likely due to most of the participants not feeling 
threatened by domestic terrorism because they have not directly experienced it.  
Additionally, young adult public participants initially viewed counterterrorism as a 
military or war effort, and likely felt there was little they could do to contribute.  This 
concept stood out among the rest, and is perhaps one of the most important themes that 
should be taken away from this study.  These participants likely felt little involvement in 
domestic counterterrorism efforts because they felt counterterrorism efforts were only 
made by the government through military means.  They did not recognize that they can 
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support the government’s counterterrorism efforts to prevent domestic terrorism. 
Government public participants are not necessarily seeking out the information, but are 
exposed to it on a regular basis through information boards, signs at installation gates, 
and DoD training requirements.  While the majority of them were not aware of the 
campaign, most of them recognized that domestic terrorism is a threat.  Also, the majority 
of DoD employees recognized that the public has a role to play in counterterrorism 
efforts.  
All-in-all, the messages from the See Something, Say Something campaign were 
well received.  Participants came to understand the messages through concepts such as: 
awareness; vigilance; citizen responsibility; citizen empowerment; personal awareness;  
personal responsibility; and self-efficacy.  However, the reported impact of the messages 
varied between government and young adult public participants; seemingly having a 
somewhat greater impact on young adult publics than on government publics.  This 
appears to be due largely to the difference in personal life experiences, professional 
experiences, and once again, training requirements as DoD employees.  
Theoretical Implications
Situational Theory of Publics.  The situational theory of publics helped guide the 
data analysis in this research study.   While some themes were generally not surprising, 
other themes emerged which can assist in explaining how publics make meaning of 
counterterrorism messages from DHS, and its impact on their intent to act on the 
messages.  
Before young adult public participants were aware of the campaign, few of them 
recognized domestic terrorism as a threat or a problem.  Most of them felt that because 
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they had not experienced it, or because it was not in the media all of the time, that it was 
not something to be worried about.  As discussed previously, it is probable that the media 
and society in general have played a role in problem recognition, particularly among 
young adult publics.  Participants had initially expressed a lack of problem recognition 
because they felt that the messages they had been exposed to regarding terrorism in this 
country focused so heavily on the events surrounding 9/11, that it seems participants were 
unable to see any other type of terrorist threat to this country.  Therefore, they felt 
terrorism is not something that affects them directly, because perhaps, it is a threat that  
only comes from outside the borders of the United States.    
After being exposed to the campaign messages, many of those participants 
expressed a change in their feelings about the threat of domestic terrorism, saying now 
that they recognized that it is in fact a threat.  Some of these participants associated 
terrorism with Middle Easterners, or Islam.  After being exposed to the messages many of 
them recognized that other threats exist that they had never considered, challenging their 
own preconceived notions of domestic terrorism.  Problem recognition, then, appeared to 
be effected by these campaign messages.  Exposure to counterterrorism messages 
increased problem recognition amongst young adult publics, and could likely produce 
hot-issue publics.  
The majority of government public participants, on the other hand, felt that 
domestic terrorism was a threat prior to being exposed to campaign messages.  This was 
likely due to their personal and professional experiences.  Some participants work 
security for DoD, and it is their business and their responsibility to be aware of all threats 
in their immediate area, and to be able to warn others of these threats.  Other participants 
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have served many years with the government, and have been exposed so heavily to 
similar material, that, while they may have never seen or heard these messages, they are 
very similar to other messages they have been exposed to through training requirements 
with DoD.  Aldoory and Van Dyke (2006) found that problem recognition in a food 
bioterrorism scenario was affected by previously held knowledge about food safety 
issues.  It seems the same factors are at work in this study.  Government publics in this 
case tend to be very knowledgeable on domestic terrorism issues through experience and 
training.  Anti-terrorism/force protection training not only appears to impact problem 
recognition, but could also produce an active public amongst DoD employees.
Level of involvement for participants appeared to be affected by a number of 
factors: feelings of guilt, past experiences, and shared involvement or shared experience. 
Shared involvement, as discussed by Aldoory and van Dyke (2006), included: personal 
responsibility, as well as both geographical and emotional proximity to an attack.  Some 
participants felt a higher level of involvement because of feeling guilty for not saying 
something when they should.  One participant expressed feelings of guilt if she did not 
say something, and something did happen, while another participant recalled situations in 
which she should have said something, did not, and now felt guilty for not doing so. 
Government public participants in particular called upon past professional and personal 
experiences for increased levels of involvement.  Many of them already felt involved due 
to their experience and training as DoD employees.  Others felt that their job 
requirements make them involved.  Some are required to brief security information; 
others work closely with security personnel, while others have been deployed to a war 
zone and recall the requirements to remain vigilant on a daily basis.    
69
Shared involvement or experience seemed to play a significant role in how 
involved participants felt about the campaign messages.  Participant accounts from both 
publics expressed feelings of personal responsibility.  In general, the messages appeared 
to have given them a sense of accountability to others; wanting to be involved in 
reporting suspicious activity because they recognized that it is not only them who will be 
affected by an attack.  Participants described feeling a sense of responsibility or a sense 
of duty as an American citizen.  Shared involvement became particularly evident when 
participants were geographically or emotionally tied to a terrorist event.  Similar to what  
Aldoory and Van Dyke (2006) found, high levels of involvement became noticeable when 
participant’s community, family, and friends were perceived to be at risk.  One participant 
had continually expressed his love for his community and a concern for those in it.  Other 
participants, when presented with the idea that an attack occurred in or near their 
hometown, expressed great concern for the well-being of their family and friends back 
home.  The prospect of an attack suddenly became more real, and they had a personal 
stake in the outcome.  
Others discussed personal experiences when 9/11 happened, due to their 
hometown being in close proximity to New York City or Washington D.C.  Some 
participants had family and friends in the city at the time and spoke of their concern for 
them, and the idea of something happening like that again terrified them.  This was 
particularly evident among young adult publics, but even some government public 
participants expressed similar sentiments.  While some at first had said that being close to 
an attack did not make them feel different, they had gone on to share real-life experiences 
with the sniper attacks in the Washington D.C. area in 2002.  As they talked about that 
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time, they expressed the fear and concern they had for themselves and their families. 
This supports the findings from Aldoory, Kim, and Tindall (2010) that shared experience 
“might be a worthy antecedent variable to examine for the situational theory of publics.” 
These findings also indicate that level of involvement seemed to have a direct impact on 
problem recognition, which supports the findings from Aldoory and Van Dyke (2006), 
that perhaps level of involvement should be further examined as an antecedent variable to 
problem recognition.  Additionally, this supports findings from a study by Wise and his 
colleagues (2009), which examined how proximity of threatening health news would 
affect people’s processing of it.  The authors argued that proximity to a threat impacts 
how susceptible one feels, and susceptibility affects how threatening news is processed. 
The closer one is to a threat, the stronger their response will be.  They found that people 
would turn to news that is personally relevant, and would appropriate more of their 
cognitive resources to high-proximity health news.    
The situational theory of publics posits that as levels of involvement and problem 
recognition increase, so to does information seeking (Aldoory & Sha, 2006; Aldoory & 
Van Dyke, 2006; Grunig, 1997; Toth, 2006).  Findings in this study support the theory. 
As level of involvement and problem recognition increased, so to did the active 
communicative behaviors by young adult public participants in particular.  When looking 
for general information on threats, most young adult public participants would be 
somewhat passive in acquiring information and selecting information domains, relying on 
one-way communication channels such as the news, or public government websites. 
When young adult public participants were faced with the idea of an attack occurring in 
or near their hometown, many more participants began to express a more active 
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communicative behavior.  While most would still rely on news coverage, many more, 
including many of those who would turn to the news, expressed a desire to speak directly 
with someone they knew about the scenario.  
Similarly, government publics were also more passive in their communicative 
behavior when looking for information on general threats, looking to similar sources that 
young adult publics would turn to.  When asked about an attack in or near their 
hometown, more participants became active in their communicative behavior, wanting to 
talk directly to law enforcement, family or friends, or fellow DoD employees, particularly 
those in the security realm.   
Government public participants continually expressed a low level of constraint 
recognition throughout the interview, while mental barriers appeared to be a significant 
factor in constraint recognition with regards to young adult public participants. 
Government public participants would often discuss how the messages were nothing new 
to them because it is similar to the required training they receive from DoD.  Others 
would point to their years of experience working for the government, and that they were 
already well aware of what they can and should do if they see suspicious activity.  It is 
something they have dealt with daily as government employees.  While DoD employees 
did express feelings of self-efficacy, most of them did not feel different after viewing the 
messages; although they did feel a renewed sense of vigilance, which they felt was 
important.  
Mental barriers appeared to have prevented young adult public participants from 
realizing the potential impact they could have on domestic counterterrorism efforts, and 
likely kept them from seeking information about counterterrorism efforts being made by 
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the government.  Many participants expressed a lack of perceived self-efficacy in being 
able to do anything about potential threats.  Others discussed a fear of saying something 
that they saw because maybe it was nothing, or because they simply did not know what 
suspicious activity looked like.  The messages appeared to provide these participants with 
the knowledge of what to look for, the motivation to remain vigilant, and the courage to 
speak up when they see something out of the ordinary.  These findings, along with the 
findings of increased levels of constraint and problem recognition, support the situational 
theory of problem solving, in that higher levels of involvement and problem recognition, 
and low levels of constraint recognition, increased participants situational motivation,  
which led to an increase in Communicative Action in Problem Solving.  Young adult 
public participants demonstrated that when faced with the problem of domestic terrorism, 
they would actively seek out information (information seeking), attend to that 
information (information attending), through a domain in which they actively selected 
(information forefending).  
Framing Theory.  While framing theory was not being examined in this research 
study, evidence of the effects of framing was present in the data.  In communication, 
framing is a way to provide information to audiences.  It brings together information that 
is used to present a story to an audience in a manner that is designed to influence.  A 
frame is “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding 
strip of events” (Tewksbury and Scheufele, 2009, p. 19).  Certain aspects of a message or 
situation are highlighted in order to make them more salient to the public.  A framing 
effect then, is the resulting change in a decision from message exposure (Iyengar, 1991; 
Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009).
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When asked about terrorism, many participants displayed effects of episodic 
framing.  Episodic frames are sometimes used for attribution of responsibility, which 
seeks to assign blame for an issue or problem to an organization or an individual 
(Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).  Episodic frames are directed towards a particular event 
or individual, using concise, personal stories, in order to assign responsibility and blame 
for an event or series of events to an individual (An & Gower, 2009; Iyengar, 1991; 
Wallack, Dorfman, Jernigan, & Themba, 1993).  The results of the data show that there 
may be some effect of episodic framing on individuals, particularly among young adult 
public participants.  Participant accounts show that many relate terrorism to an attack; 
namely the events of 9/11, or suicide bombers, or other types of bombings.  Again, given 
their age with respect to the events of 9/11, this was not surprising, and shows the 
possible effects of episodic frames being used by both the media and the government.  
Framing effects were again evident when discussing counterterrorism.  When 
asked about counterterrorism, participant accounts indicate that many see 
counterterrorism in the context of the War on Terror.  Participants either mentioned the 
wars in Iraq or Afghanistan specifically, or they mentioned events that have occurred as a 
part of this effort, such as the killing of Osama Bin Laden, or CIA drone attacks.  This 
War on Terror frame was again most prevalent among young adult public participants and 
was again not surprising given their age, in which most of them would have grown up 
with these wars.  It was perhaps somewhat surprising not to see it more prevalent among 
government public participants.  This could be due to the age difference.  This could also 
be due to their training and experience as DoD employees, and that they recognize that 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are but a small piece of the counterterrorism effort, 
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particularly when it comes to the threat of domestic terrorism.  The United States has 
used the War on Terror frame since 9/11 to describe its efforts to combat terrorism.  Some 
have cautioned against its use.  As Corman and his colleagues (2008) argued, “you cannot 
go to war with a noun and hope to have a decisive victory” (p. 182).  The war frame 
indicates that someone will be defeated at the end; to which terrorism never will be.  It  
may also indicate that the government sees its efforts as a war, which could play into the 
hands of extremists, while isolating other publics who feel they are wrongly targeted by 
this war.  The results of this study indicate a strong presence of the War on Terror frame 
with young adult publics, and something that DHS will want to strongly consider moving 
forward with this campaign.  
Trust and Credibility.  Issues of trust and credibility became important factors 
when participants discussed what sources they would seek out for information on threats 
or actual attacks.  Participant accounts indicate that news and government sources would 
be the most heavily sought out source when participants wanted to get information on 
current threats or an attack that occurred near home.  Participants felt that these sources 
would be the most informed sources available.  Many government public participants 
would specifically seek out colleagues who work anti-terrorism or security; both publics 
indicating that government sources are viewed as credible, trusted sources among 
participants.  Some participants would turn to news sources for information on current 
threats.  It seems that participants trust news sources that they are familiar with, or that 
they feel focus on a wide variety of issues.  Some government public participants would 
use foreign news sources as a way to get a balanced view on issues.  
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Interestingly, only two participants had mentioned seeing the media as having a 
role in counterterrorism.  This is likely due to the majority of participants viewing 
counterterrorism as more of an effort being made by the government.  It did not appear to 
be an issue of trust or credibility, as the majority of participants would look to the media 
for information about threats in general or near their hometown.    
As level of involvement for participants increased, they appeared to put an 
increased faith for information in local sources, such as law enforcement officials, local 
community leaders, family and friends, or local colleagues as just discussed.  These 
results support Pollard’s (2004) findings in his study to understand how the public 
obtained information and how they perceived information sources during the 2001 
anthrax attacks.  Participants had indicated that if an event occurred locally, local health  
officials were trusted more than national health officials.    
Making meaning of campaign messages.  This study supports other literature on 
how publics make meaning of campaign messages.  As previously noted, the goal of this 
campaign is to raise awareness and give people the tools they need to take action in the 
face of suspicious activity.  (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010b).  Henderson 
(2005) argued that when a campaign has a goal of getting publics to take action, it must 
find a way to meet their needs.  Several young adult public participants in particular 
expressed a desire to be involved, but felt that before being exposed to the campaign 
messages they did not know how.  The campaign messages showed them what action to 
take when they saw suspicious activity, such as that displayed in the messages.  After 
exposure, many participants felt they now had the know how to take action and felt 
compelled to do so.       
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Henderson (2005) and Tilson and Stacks (1997) argued that a two-way 
communication campaign is more effective than a propaganda approach in a crisis or 
issues management.  Further, using both interpersonal communication and a promotional 
campaign can better increase knowledge and motivate publics to act.  Additionally,  
Alcalay and Taplin (1989) argued the importance of community involvement in public 
communication campaigns; such as the use of local resources, leaders, and community 
members.  Findings in this study support such arguments.  As discussed previously, as 
participants became more involved in the messages of the campaign, they expressed more 
of a desire to communicate with local sources, and became more active in their 
communicative behaviors.  Thus, two-way communication with local sources, while 
utilizing local community resources may be the most effective means for increasing 
knowledge of and getting publics to act on the messages of the See Something, Say  
Something campaign.                               
Practical Implications
Communicating counterterrorism messages.  This study provides some significant 
insights into ways in which DHS can more effectively communicate their 
counterterrorism messages.  First, this study shows the importance of segmenting publics. 
It was apparent throughout the interviews that government public participants had a 
different perspective on terrorism and counterterrorism than the general public.  Due to 
their positions with the government, it seemed that government public participants were 
already at the level of preparedness that the messages hoped to bring young adult public 
participants to.  This potentially indicates that government public participants require an 
entirely different approach when it comes to counterterrorism communication.  Given 
77
that most government public participants had not heard of this campaign, it appears that 
DHS is allowing DoD to relay its own similar messages to their employees.  While these 
messages appear to have a similar effect, it may be important for DHS to work more 
closely with DoD as to their campaign efforts.  Government public participants, who 
work in the security realm, indicated that they do work with the local community and 
emergency personnel immediately outside the installation.  If security and anti-terrorism 
personnel on the installation are aware that these efforts are being made in the civilian 
sector, they may be able to work more effectively in helping the local community get the 
messages out to the public.  The local installation should have a vested interest in making 
the public in the local community more aware of their surroundings.  
Second, this study demonstrates that an organization implementing a campaign 
such as this should plan and execute communicative strategies that target inactive publics.  
Hallahan (2000) offered inactive publics as a type of public not directly identified in the 
situational theory of publics.  Inactive publics are “groups composed of individuals who 
possess comparatively low levels of knowledge about an organization and low levels of 
involvement in its operations” (Hallahan, 2000, p. 504).  DHS is hoping to raise 
awareness and get people involved.  Essentially, they are trying to get inactive publics to 
become active on issues of domestic terrorism, but not necessarily active in every aspect 
of DHS’s responsibilities.  The results of this study indicate that young adult publics are 
not active on these issues.  Publics have knowledge of the issue, and involvement with 
the organization (Hallahan, 2000).  This is what makes them a public.  Young adult 
publics displayed limited knowledge of these issues and limited involvement with DHS, 
thus making them inactive.  Inactive publics typically do not seek out information on an 
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issue or about an organization.  Thus, it becomes the responsibility of the organization to 
seek out and communicate with these groups.  In order to make publics active on the 
issue, Hallahan (2000) argued organizations must motivate and enable inactive publics to 
focus on their messages.  Additionally, they must afford them the opportunities to do so 
by using both two-way symmetric and one-way asymmetrical communication.
Third, this study indicates that the media and the government’s framing of 
terrorism and counterterrorism are having an impact on how terrorism and terrorists are 
perceived.  The majority of young adult public participants struggled to disassociate 
terrorism from the events of 9/11, the Global War on Terrorism, or Islam, including key 
figures associated with Islamic radicalism; some were even embarrassed to admit it.  
None of the young adult public participants were able to connect terrorism with other acts 
of domestic terrorism such as the Oklahoma City bombings, or anti-abortion terrorism, or 
environmental terrorism.  While most recognized that DHS was making an effort to 
extinguish these views, and expressed a change in those feelings after being exposed to 
the messages, as the effects of these messages fade, and the presence of messages about 
the ongoing wars or Islamic terrorism continues, publics could possibly revert to their old 
feelings.  This likely played a part in the counterterrorism as a military/war effort theme 
and lack of involvement as discussed earlier.
With regards to the campaign itself, participants felt that DHS should do more to 
get the message out to the public.  All were receptive to the messages, but few had ever 
heard of the campaign.  They felt DHS should utilize the media, television commercials,  
advertising on college campuses, using posters in public places, and using social media to 
relay their message.  Publics also expressed a desire to see success stories from the 
79
campaign.  They want to see the faces of those who did see something, and did say 
something.  Because publics felt more compelled to act as they became more involved 
with the problem, the messages may be more effective if the publics can relate with those 
who have been directly impacted by potential acts of terrorism or crime.  As you will 
recall, DHS is ultimately trying to prevent a crisis from occurring.  Stakeholders, and it 
could be argued that all residents of the U.S. are a stakeholder in this case, want to know 
that the organization is making every effort to prevent a crisis from occurring (Coombs, 
2012).  Being as transparent as possible is perhaps a good strategy for DHS to utilize.   
Public Relations/Public Affairs practitioners.  This study offers valuable 
understanding into how public relations and public affairs practitioners can more 
effectively engage their publics.  First of all, it is crucial to conduct formative research 
and understand how your target publics make meaning of the subject so as to make the 
best use of available resources.  As put forth by Rice and Atkin (2009), the results of this 
study indicate that predispositions of the different publics did impact how they made 
meaning of the campaign messages, which can subsequently effect how they are 
segmented.  This is similar to what Grunig and Repper (1992) had referred to as inferred 
variables, which measure individual views, beliefs, and values.  While objective variables 
such as demographics were not specifically analyzed in this study, inferred variable did 
seem to be an important factor for both publics; although some objective variables such 
as race and age could be a factor.  As mentioned earlier, Public Affairs specialists can 
benefit from bringing together DoD anti-terrorism personnel with local community 
leaders, as well as law enforcement and other emergency personnel in the surrounding 
area of their installation, in order to work together to make the goals of this campaign a 
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mutual success.  Finally, choosing the right tactics for getting the message out is of the 
utmost importance.  Channel selection in this campaign does not seem to have been 
effective at this point, as few of the young adult public participants had heard of this 
campaign, and only a few government public participants had.  When relaying a message 
to the public, particularly one of this nature, seeing is believing.  In a campaign such as 
this, publics might not always be sure of themselves.  If they have seen the success stories 
of others, and understand that they can have a positive impact, they may be more likely to 
act on the campaign messages.
Limitations
This study provides some valuable insight on counterterrorism messaging, but 
does have some limitations that must be addressed.  First, I was only able to interview a 
small number of participants due to limits on both time and available resources.  Future 
research could include a larger number of interviews.  Second, young adult public 
participants were limited with regards to their age range.  The age range of the 
government public participants increased the overall age range for the sample, but was 
limited by types of publics.  There were examples of age having an impact on how 
publics make meaning of the campaign messages.  Future research could include 
sampling participants by age groups for a different perspective.  This study sample is also 
limited by its geographical location.  While the study took place near a major 
metropolitan area, a place that DHS appears to be targeting with this campaign, it does 
not consider how geographical location may impact how publics make meaning of 
terrorism and counterterrorism and the campaign messages.  Future research could 
include such an analysis. 
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 Methodologically, the study is limited by only conducting one interview with 
each participant.  Most participants had never heard of the campaign, and therefore the 
campaign video and other materials had to be presented to participants as a part of the 
interview.  Naturally the information was fresh on their mind.  Future research could 
include a quantitative or qualitative longitudinal study to examine the lasting effects of  
the messages on participants.  
While this study did record variables such as race and gender, no questions were 
asked about how these variables may play a role in how the public makes meaning of the 
topic.  Because a snowball sampling technique was used to recruit participants, this study 
was not able to get large enough sample sizes of different racial groups, or enough of one 
gender or another to determine how such variables would impact participant’s 
perspectives.   Additionally, this study did not look at how political affiliation could affect  
meaning making of the messages.  When DHS was founded in 2002, the world was not 
far removed from 9/11.  Additionally, it was founded by a Republican President.  Ten 
years have passed since 9/11, and a democrat is in the Office of the President, 
implementing his own policies and procedures.  A mixed methods study that looks at how 
publics make meaning of the campaign messages with the participants stratified into their  
political affiliation may yield some interesting results.  
Finally, this study did not use real life terrorist scenarios to determine how publics 
would be affected by such events.  Instead, the publics were only asked about a 
hypothetical situation to determine how they would feel if an attack were to occur close 
to home.  Future research could use actual terrorist events that have either occurred or 
have been foiled in order to get a more thorough analysis of its effects.  
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Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to understand how publics make meaning of 
terrorism and counterterrorism and the messages from the DHS See Something, Say  
Something counterterrorism campaign, and if that meaning has impacted their intention to 
act on these messages.  Using the situational theory of publics, this study provides 
valuable insight into an important topic that has been relatively unexplored.  Additionally,  
this study looked at the variables of the recently proposed expansion of situational theory 
of publics, the situational theory of problem solving, to examine how the new variables, 
which are designed to augment the situational theory of publics, impacted how publics 
made meaning of these messages and subsequently acted after being exposed to them.  
The study found that how publics make meaning of the concepts of terrorism and 
counterterrorism are effected by what type of public they are associated with.  Other 
demographic issues such as age could possibly have an impact as well.  Thus, segmenting 
publics using both inferred and objective variables could prove useful in getting these 
types of messages to the public.  Young adult public participants in this study did not 
appear to be actively seeking out information about counterterrorism, as few had heard of 
this campaign and few of them felt terrorism was a threat to them.  Using the right 
channels to reach the properly segmented publics could prove to be important moving 
forward.  I also found that as the participants became more involved with the messages of 
the campaign and the problem began to impact them directly, they became more active in  
their communicative behaviors, as posited by both situational theories.  
Now that tenth anniversary of 9/11 has come and gone, DHS could take this as an 
opportunity to reenergize and refocus their campaign efforts.  In future campaign efforts, 
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DHS should consider some of the primary themes in this study.  First, it is prudent to 
again point out that young adult publics predominately saw counterterrorism as a military 
or war effort.  This is likely related to the terrorist profiles theme.  The majority of young 
adult public participants felt terrorists fit a certain profile, such as “Muslim” or “Islam” or 
“Middle Eastern.”  DHS should make a concerted effort to relay a different message. 
Young adult publics, similar to those of this study, need to be aware that threats of 
domestic threats terrorism can come from all corners of the country.  The campaign 
messages are emphasizing that people should be looking for behaviors, and not a certain 
type of person.  The messages did resonate with some of the participants who initially felt 
that terrorists fit a certain profile.  DHS should continue to articulate this message, but 
should also seek new ways of relaying it to the public.  Some participants in this study, 
young adult public participants in particular, discussed how they never even thought of 
Timothy McVeigh as a terrorist when they saw his image flash across the screen during 
the campaign video.  In future messages, DHS could release statistics from other known 
terrorist organizations that exist within the U.S. aside from Muslim or Middle Eastern 
groups to continue to broaden publics’ understanding of who terrorists are.  DHS could 
also work more closely with mainstream media to share stories of foiled and successful 
plots from these groups as well.  This ties back into framing theory, and is known by 
some as framing for content; or obtaining access to the media and framing a story the 
way an organization wants it to be told in order to help influence the public (Wallack et 
al., 1993).
Second, DHS should consider the counterterrorism as a citizen’s responsibility 
theme.  Publics want to be involved, responsible, and empowered.  They want to be more 
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aware, and they want to feel that they can make a difference.  The messages from the 
campaign video appear to be making publics feel this way.  One way DHS could do more 
in this area moving forward is working closely with local communities.  Many 
participants expressed more involvement as the potential for an attack became closer to 
home, and many wanted to talk to someone local about such an event.  DHS should 
consider working closely with local officials and local community groups throughout the 
country; groups that are trusted by the community.  This could give people more of a 
sense of responsibility and involvement for the well-being of those in their community. 
This study also indicates that many would still rely on news sources for information. 
Thus, DHS should work continue working closely with national as well as local media to 
ensure the story is getting out.  Some young adult public participants expressed a desire 
to utilize social media in such a scenario.  While DHS has social networking sites, they 
could recommend and provide guidelines so that all levels of government down to the 
lowest levels have social media where they could not only relay information, but use it as 
a two-way communication platform with local residents who have concerns during the 
course of the events.  Government public participants seem to have many of their 
preferred channels in place.  One participant, however, thought working with local 
community groups was a good approach for DHS to take, and offered some insightful 
recommendations.  She felt that groups were already in place that people trust that could 
help in these efforts, such as Home Owner’s Associations, or military Family Readiness 
Groups.  Family Readiness Groups in particular have meetings on a regular basis to 
discuss issues concerning family members within the military unit.  Such forums can help 
relay DHS’ messages through an already trusted group, which can help further the trust in 
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DHS’ efforts as a whole.  Additionally, DHS could work more closely with DoD to 
facilitate communication with the community immediately outside installations nation  
wide.  DHS and DoD are missing an important opportunity there.  
Finally, DHS should consider some of the factors that affect meaning.  Many 
participants felt the video was too long.  DHS should think about developing similar 
messages that are shorter in length, and can be distributed through public service 
announcements, fliers, and posters.   Additionally, publics in this study appear to want 
DHS to be transparent with their efforts.  They do not want to be kept in the dark.  DHS 
should share their successes with the general public.  Many participants, young adult 
publics in particular, expressed concern that if they had not been a participant in this 
study, they would have never heard about the campaign.  They have no reason to search 
for the messages, or go on DHS’ website to search for information.  One way to relay 
success stories is by stepping-up their social media efforts is to try to attract more 
followers to their Facebook and Twitter sights by working more closely with local 
government and communities.  Some of the young adult public participants had 
suggested working with the college campus.  This could prove useful, particularly on 
campuses in large metropolitan areas where students utilize public transportation on a 
regular basis.  As previously discussed, there is the potential for the development of hot-
issue publics amongst this inactive public.  
In conclusion, the results of this study confirm that when preparing a public 
campaign, it is important to identify and research your key publics, determine what 
tactics will be most effective, using the most efficient channels.  While reaching out to 
active publics may be effective, inactive publics should not be ignored.  In this study, 
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inactive publics should be a priority for DHS, as government participants were already 
active to the level that DHS is trying to achieve.  If DHS takes the necessary steps before 
launching campaign messages, they can make the most of their limited resources.  
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Table 1:  Participant Demographics Matrix.1
Participant Major/Government 
Position




Participant 1 Epidemiology F Graduate 
Student
26 Asian
Participant 2 Communication F Junior 33 Black – African
Participant 3 Journalism F Junior 20 White
Participant 4 Government and Politics F Junior 20 Middle Eastern
Participant 5 Communication F Junior 22 White
Participant 6 Family and Consumer 
Sciences
M Senior 22 Asian
Participant 7 Education F Senior 20 White
Participant 8 Computer Science M Sophomore 19 Black
Participant 9 Education F Junior 20 Persian
Participant 10 Public Health F Junior 19 Black
Participant 11 Communication F Senior 22 East Indy/Asian
Participant 12 International Business F Sophomore 18 Black
Participant 13 Communication F Senior 22 White
Participant 14 General Biology F Junior 20 Asian
Participant 15 Communication M Senior 20 White
Department of Defense Employees (Internal Public)
Participant 16 Public Affairs F N/A 41 Other
Participant 17 Public Affairs M N/A 41 White
Participant 18 Division Chief, Security F N/A 50 White
Participant 19 Security Specialist M N/A 40 White
Participant 20 Operations F N/A 44 White
Participant 21 Resource Management F N/A 55 White
Participant 22 Operations M N/A 50 White
Participant 23 Military reservist F N/A 54 White
Participant 24 Operational 
Management
M N/A 61 White
Participant 25 Security Specialist M N/A 52 White
F = 17 




East Indy/Asian = 
1
Persian = 1
Middle Eastern = 1
Black – African = 
1
Other = 1
1 The participant demographics matrix is a slightly modified version of the matrix used by Bloomberg and 
Volpe (2008).  
88
Appendix A: In-depth Interview Protocol
Purpose: to understand how publics make meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism and 
the messages from the DHS See Something, Say Something counterterrorism campaign
RESEARCH QUESTION:
1.  How does the public make meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism in general?








______Thank the informant for participating
______Introduce the study
Interview Questions:
1. How old are you? Year? Major/minor?  (Government employees will be asked 
what their duty is as an employee). What is your racial identity?  
2. When you hear the word “terrorism,” what do you think of?
3. Do you feel threatened by domestic terrorism? Why or why not?
4. When you hear the word “counterterrorism,” what do you think of?  
5. Have you heard of the See Something, Say Something Campaign?
a. If so, please tell me your understanding of it.
The interviewer will first provide press releases for the participant to read, followed by  
campaign video.  
6. What do you think about these messages from DHS?
a. What do you think DHS is trying to do with this campaign?
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b. Do you think the information is valuable? Why or why not?
c. Do the messages make you feel differently about the threat of domestic 
terrorism?
7. Do you think these messages effectively communicate terrorist threats to the 
American public? Why or why not?
a. Do you think that DHS is effective in combating domestic terrorism? Why 
or why not?
b. Do you think DHS is focusing its counterterrorism efforts in the right 
place? Why or why not?
8. Do the messages in this campaign compel you to be more vigilant in your day-to-
day life? Why or why not?
a. Do you feel it provides you with the right tools to be more vigilant? 
b. How does that compare to before you were aware of the campaign or its 
messages?  (if applicable)
9. Does this campaign make you feel as though you need to be more aware of the 
terrorist threat?  Why or why not?
a. Where would you look for information on current threats?
b. If a terrorist attack did occur in or near your hometown, where would you 
turn for information on what happened? 
i. Does the idea of an attack occurring in or near your hometown 
make you feel any different about the threat of domestic terrorism?
c. If DHS provided you with ways to prepare yourself for a terrorist attack, 
such as an emergency kit, would you do so? Why or why not?
10. Who should be responsible for counterterrorism efforts?
11. What do you think DHS could do to more effectively communicate their message 
to the public?
12. Is there anything important that you would like to share before we wrap up?
I would again like to thank you for your participation today.  Have a great day.
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Appendix B: Consent Form
Project Title Remaining Vigilant Against Domestic Terrorism:
A Case Study of the See Something, Say Something Campaign
Purpose of the Study This research is being conducted by Dr. Brooke Fisher Liu and Thomas 
Campbell at the University of Maryland, College Park.  We are inviting 
you to participate in this research project because we seek to understand 
your perspective on the topic.   The purpose of this research project is 
study is to understand how publics make meaning of the messages from 
the DHS See Something, Say Something campaign.  
Procedures The procedures involve interviewing several undergraduate students and 
government employees in both individual and focus group interviews. 
These groups will be conducted in person at a date and time determined by 
you and the researcher. Individual interviews should last about one hour 
and will be audio recorded.  The focus groups will last approximately one 
to two hours and will be both audio and video recorded. You may decline 
to be recorded and still participate in the study.  Questions will focus on 
describing your ideas of terrorism and counterterrorism.  You will also be 
exposed to campaign videos from DHS, and asked questions about your 
understanding and perspective of these videos messages. A few of the 
possible questions include:  When you hear the word “terrorism” what do 
you think of?  Do you believe you have a role in protecting your community 
from domestic terrorism? Why or why not?  When you picture a domestic 
terrorist, what does that person look like?  For undergraduate students, 




There may be some risks from participating in this research study with 
regards to potential for the loss/breach of confidentiality. However, every 
step will be taken to ensure this does not occur.  All information will be 
kept confidential to which only the researchers involved will have access. 
Your name will not be identified or linked to the data you provide at any 
time. 
Potential Benefits This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results  
may help the investigator learn more about how publics make meaning 
of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as the See Something, Say 
Something campaign messages.  Further we hope this research will help 
DHS communicate more effectively with the public.    
Confidentiality Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing digital 
data on a password protected computer that only the researchers will have 
access to.  Additionally, written data will be stored in a locked cabinet. 
Your name will not be included pre-focus group questionnaire or other 
collected data.  A code will be placed on the questionnaire and other 
collected data.  Through the use of an identification key, the researcher will 
be able to link your questionnaire to your identity, and only the researchers 
will have access to the identification key.
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If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will 
be protected to the maximum extent possible.  Your information may be 
shared with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or 
governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are 
required to do so by law. 
Please initial:
___  I agree to be audio and/or video recorded during my participation in 
this study
___     I do not agree to be audio and/or video recorded during my 
participation in this study
Right to Withdraw 
and Questions
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  You may 
choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this research, 
you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not to participate in 
this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized 
or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.  If you are an employee 
or student, your employment status or academic standing at UMD will not 
be affected by your participation or non-participation in this study.
 
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the 
research, please contact the investigator, Dr. Brooke Fisher Liu at:301-
405-6524; 2130 Skinner Building, Office 2110, University of Maryland, 
College Park, MD 20742.  Email: bfliu@umd.edu; or Thomas Campbell at 
301-405-0759; 2130 Skinner Building, Office 0109, University of 
Maryland, College Park, MD 20742; Email: tcampbe2@umd.edu 
Participant Rights If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to 
report a research-related injury, please contact: 
University of Maryland College Park 
Institutional Review Board Office
1204 Marie Mount
College Park, Maryland, 20742
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu  
Telephone: 301-405-0678
This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, 
College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.
Statement of Consent Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have 
read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have 
been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate 
in this research study. You will receive a copy of this signed consent form.
If you agree to participate, please sign your name below.
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